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DELIVERING A COMMUNITY EMPLOYMENT LAW: A
TALE OF TWO MECHANISMS
Gavin Barrett*

I. ELUSIVE
POLICY

CONSENSUS:

COMMUNITY

SOCIAL

Consensus between member states of the European Union on the
appropriate general direction of European social policy has always tended
to be difficult to reach. Notwithstanding the relative broadening and
deepening of Community social policy in recent years, this continues to be
so. Freedland’s observation (made in 1996) that there is no single clear or
accepted policy agenda for employment law in the European Union still
rings true—as does Shaw’s acknowledgment of the difficulty involved in
pointing to common themes in Community social policy. 1
In some respects Community social policy needs to run (or, perhaps one
should say, ought to have run) in order to stand still. The core project of
the European Community has, from the time of its inception, been market
integration. Community rules aimed at market integration have inevitable
redistributive effects—for example, between more and less efficient
*

Senior Lecturer, School of Law, University College Dublin. Amended version of paper
prepared for the Irish European Law Forum, Tenth Annual Conference, Regulating
Liberalising Markets and Social Europe: New Governance in the EU, University College,
Dublin, 19 January 2007. My thanks are offered to my colleague Professor Imelda Maher
for originally suggesting the topic, to Professor Colin Scott and the other participants in
the Forum for suggestions on how it might be further developed.
1

M. Freedland, “Employment Policy” in P. Davies et al, European Labour Law:
Principles and Perspectives—Liber Amicorum Lord Wedderburn (1996, Clarendon Press,
Oxford) and J. Shaw, “Twin-Track Social Europe—the Inside Track” in D. O’Keeffe and
P. Twomey (eds.), Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty (1994, Wiley, Chichester) both
of which are quoted in P. Syrpis “The Integrationist Rationale for European Social
Policy” in J. Shaw (ed.), Social Law and Policy in an Evolving European Union 17 at 17.
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member states, regions, industries and enterprises—and inevitable
consequences for those who work in affected enterprises or industries. The
question of how (and indeed whether) the Community should respond to
the redistributive effects of its own policies is one which poses itself.
In practice, even when the Community has decided to react by intervening
in the employment law field, difficulties in bringing about any Community
response have tended to abound. Market integration is a project which for
long has been seen to be capable of being achieved—and indeed to a large
extent has been achieved—by negative integration (i.e., the outlawing of
national rules which prevent the creation of a single European market).
Such negative integration is a process which is well capable of being
destructive of national rules on social protection.2 In theory such national
rules can be replaced by equivalent European-level norms, protecting the
same social interests as were formally protected at national level, but the
reality is that negative integration (involving the judicial condemnation of
national rules hampering the operation of a European single market,
absent any justification deemed adequate for such rules) is far easier to
achieve than the arduous work of positive integration (involving the
creation of common standards and legal frameworks) in any policy field.
Indeed, particular considerations applying to social policy make the task
of positive integration in this field even more difficult. Social policy is an
area in which integrationist pressures must compete both (i) with
arguments regarding the retention of sovereignty by member states in a
whole range of areas touched upon by Community social policy, and (ii)
with ideological objections relating to e.g., the appropriate role of
regulation in governing the employer-employee relationship—objections
which would be themes for debate even were social policy to be regulated
entirely at national level.
Analyses have been offered suggesting arguments as to whether the
Community should have a social policy at all, and offering justifications
(whether economically-based or rooted in other justifications, such as
2

Note, for example, the influence of the famous Sunday Trading cases saga on United
Kingdom laws concerning the opening of shops on Sunday, even if those laws were
ultimately upheld by the European Court of Justice.
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citizenship or human rights) for any such policy, or whether it should rely
on regulatory competition between member states in order to establish
social standards.3 The reality, however, has been that the general path of
Community social policy, confronted with difficulties such as those
mentioned above, has not been decided on by reference to such arguments.
Rather, it has trod along a path of least resistance in relation to issues
which member states regard, for whatever reason, as sensitive or highpriority topics. The result has been the creation of an ad hoc and somewhat
incoherent set of European social policy priorities. These priorities have
been usefully characterised by Fitzpatrick as a pyramid, with issues given
the highest priority placed at the top of the pyramid and vice versa. 4 In
contrast, however, with what would be expected to be the top priorities in
a genuine social constitution, (in which the highest priority might be given
to the protection of such values as freedom of association and other
aspects of collective labour law such as the right to strike, followed
(perhaps) by such values as social security law and dismissal law) the EU
social pyramid is represented—not inaccurately—as having its higher tiers
(where law-making is easiest) dedicated to such issues as worker health
and safety, employee information and consultation rights and gender
equality law, its middle tiers (typically involving a requirement of
unanimous voting for the adoption of norms) dedicated to issues such as
social security rights and only its lower tiers (in which positive legislation
has sometimes been precluded by Treaty rules 5) concerned with
protection for collective rights such as the right of association and the right
3

See for two very useful analyses in this regard, P. Syrpis, loc. cit., and C. Barnard,
“Regulating Competitive Federalism in the European Union? The Case of EC Social
Policy” both of which are to be found in J. Shaw, op. cit.. See also e.g., S. Deakin and F.
Wilkinson, “Rights vs. Efficiency? The Economic Case for Transnational Labour
Standards” (1994) 23 ILJ 289, P. Davies, “The Emergence of European Labour Law” in
McCarthy (ed.) Legal Intervention in Industrial Relations: Gains and Losses (Oxford,
Basil Blackwell, 1992) 344 and such Community documents as the Commission White
Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment (COM (93)700).
4

B. Fitzpatrick, “Converse Pyramids and the EU Social Constitution” in Shaw, op. cit., at
303
5

Hence Article 137(5) of the EC Treaty.
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to strike. In each case the determining factor for the relative level of
priority given to these issues is that
the higher up a national pyramid a set of laws reside, the more
cherished they are within that system and the greater will be
the resistance to their transplantation into equally elevated
positions within other legal systems. In the context of European
integration, it therefore requires powerful integrative forces to
bring about Community competence over the harmonisation of
(or even minimum guarantees within) particular areas of law.
The ‘tougher’ the area of law and policy, the less likely it is
that these integrative forces will be sufficiently powerful.6
The result of this at European level has been a pyramid of social values
with an intrinsically converse nature, and “neither a recognisable hierarchy
of fundamental social rights nor a consistent and coherent system of social
law has emerged…” 7
Poiares Maduro has pointed out that the development of social rights in
the EU “does not come about as a consequence of a political conception of
the social and economic protection deserved by any European citizen” and
has observed that “redistribution in the EU occurs as a result of ad hoc
intergovernmental bargaining and not as a constitutive element of an
emerging polity founded upon a social contract which includes a criterion
of distributive justice”.8 The same writer has pointed to the danger that
without some agreement on a criterion of distributive justice, any
decisions which the EU makes which have redistributive effects “will be
6

B. Fitzpatrick, loc. cit., at 311. The ‘toughness’ referred to relates to the concept of
‘tough law’ deployed by Kahn-Freund in his well-known article “On the Uses and
Misuses of Comparative Law” (1974) 37 MLR 1 to refer to areas such as collective
labour law.
7

8

B. Fitzpatrick, loc. cit., at 316.

M. Poiares Maduro, “Europe’s Social Self: ‘The Sickness Unto Death’” in J. Shaw
(ed.), op. cit., 325 at 337 and 342.
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seen as a simple reflection of the balance of power in the EU and as
lacking general social legitimacy”.9
The consequences of the inability to create the consensus necessary to
formulate some kind of vision of the social vocation of the European
Union may yet be profound. (Poiares Maduro himself has borrowed as a
metaphor for what he sees as a refusal of the European Union to discuss its
social self, the Danish philosopher Kierkegaard’s notion—developed in a
quite different context—of a ‘sickness unto death’.10) On the political
level, a perception that the contribution of the EU is a negative one in
social policy terms seems to have been a significant element of the refusal
of the French electorate to endorse the Constitutional Treaty in
referendum—an event which serves to underscore, inter alia, the political
importance which determining the direction of Community social policy
has.
All is not doom and gloom for those in favour of an active European social
policy, however. Partly in consequence of the tensions in this policy field,
and the difficulty in making progress here, the field of European
employment law has for long also constituted a testing ground for
reconceptualisations both of the methods and of the instruments of
governance at European level. Numerous examples can be given. Those
interested in the influence of soft law instruments in the law can look to
the operation and influence both of the Community Charter of
Fundamental Social Rights and, more recently, of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Those interested in the
operation (and allegedly centripetal force) of enhanced cooperation can
look to the experience of the Community as regards the operation of the
Social Policy Agreement and Social Policy Protocol, with the provisions
of the Agreement now finding themselves substantively reproduced in the
Social Chapter of the EC Treaty. An early and significant example of the
9

Loc. cit., at p. 348.

10

The Sickness Unto Death: a Christian Psychological Exposition for Edification and
Awakening written pseudonymously by S. Kierkegaard sub. nom. Anti-Climacus,
(English translation 1989, Penguin, Harmondsworth). In essence, the idea is one of a
human being who refuses to accept the meaning of his of her life.

6
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Open Method of Coordination in action was provided by the Employment
Title (Part 3, Title VIII) of the EC Treaty, mandating a coordinated
strategy between the employment. And of course, a radical innovation in
the field of governance—although by now a well-established one—has
been the role given to the process of social dialogue in the Maastricht
Social Policy Agreement, with the relevant provisions now found in
Articles 138 and 139 of the EC Treaty.
It is intended, in the remainder of this paper, to offer some reflections (of
somewhat unequal duration, although perhaps justifiably so) on two of the
most significant methods by which EU governance (for which we may
read European Community governance) has traditionally been delivered in
the social policy field, and to reflect on some of the possibilities and
problems associated therewith. The role of the European social dialogue is
first examined, followed by an examination of legislation as a policy tool.
Effectiveness—or ‘output legitimacy’, as it has sometimes been termed—
is of course a central concern in this paper. However, so too is ‘input
legitimacy’ and the question of. For, as Armstrong has observed, “the
evolution of EU governance in the field of social policy raises crucial
constitutional questions about the range of voices and identities heard in
EU decision-making processes.” 11

II. BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF THE LAW?
SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND COMMUNITY SOCIAL POLICY
Social dialogue generally may be defined as communication activity
involving social partners which is intended to influence the arrangement
and development of work-related issues. (In Marxist terminology, it would
be referred to as ‘class cooperation’, or more pejoratively as ‘class
collaboration’). At European level, it refers to the various discussions,
consultations, negotiations and joint initiatives undertaken by the social
11

K. Armstrong, “Governance and the Single European Market” in G. de Búrca and P.
Craig, The Evolution of EU Law (OUP, Oxford, 1999) 745 at p. 771.
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partner organisations representing labour, on the one hand, and
management on the other. It is a process which has been enshrined in
Articles 138 and 139 of the EC Treaty since the coming into force of the
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, although in reality it has been in existence
for far longer than this, since these articles replicate provisions formerly
found in the Social Policy Agreement annexed to the Social Policy
Protocol annexed to the EC Treaty at Maastricht and in force since 1993.12
Indeed social dialogue as a process predates even this, deriving its origins
from the ‘Val Duchesse’ dialogue between the social partners, which
began in 1985 in the chateau of the same name near Brussels, with the
enthusiastic encouragement of the Delors Commission and its President.
Betten has referred to the social dialogue as a “quasi neo-corporatist form
of social policy law making” 13 and Beirneart has described it as obviously
paralleling the Belgian industrial relations system, which provides for
similarly systematic consultation of the social partners, and, if wished, the
appropriation by them of a dossier via the drawing up of a collective
agreement.14 Social dialogue ensures that management and labour, as the
parties most affected by policy initiatives in the employment law field
have an input into whether policy steps referred to them should be taken in
the first place, and subsequently into the content of any such proposal.15
Indeed, under the relevant Treaty provisions, should the social partners
wish to do so they may actually negotiate the content of the proposal.16
Considerable autonomy is thus envisaged for the social partners. (Indeed,
the input of the social partners into the very design of this arrangement
12

Although not for the United Kingdom, at that time.

13

See L. Betten, “The Democratic Deficit of Participatory Democracy in Community
Social Policy” (1998) 23 European Law Review 20 at 28.

14

See W. Beirnaert in Twenty Years of European Social Dialogue (Directorate-General
for Employment and Social Affairs, European Commission, 2006) 16 at 17.

15

See Article 138 of the EC Treaty.

16

Article 139 of the EC Treaty.
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should not be neglected since the Treaty provisions represent in substance
the 1991 agreement which the social partners themselves reached in the
Val Duchesse talks on the appropriate role for them in the social policy
field, an agreement which was written into the text of the Social Policy
Agreement at Maastricht, from whence it found its way into the text of the
European Community Treaty at Amsterdam).
Social dialogue exists both in bipartite form (the most familiar version,
involving a dialogue only between the social partners, which is what is
involved under Article 38 of the EC Treaty) and tripartite form (which
involves dialogue not only between the social partners but with public
authorities as well, and which is exemplified by the Tripartite Social
Summit, which has existed since 2003).17
Insofar as legislative output of the social dialogue is concerned (or rather
the output of the social dialogue process under Article 138 of the EC
Treaty, frequently implemented by way of legislation under Article 139,
Bercusson has aptly described this as ‘bargaining in the shadow of the
law’, since the parties have to assess whether the result of their bargaining
will be more advantageous to them than the unknown content of any
alternative EC action.18

17

This consists of the Presidency of the Council plus the two subsequent Presidencies,
the Commission and the social partners, represented at the highest level. (See Council
Decision 2003/174/EC of 6 March 2003 establishing a Tripartite Social Summit for
Growth and Employment (OJ L 070 31 (14.03.2003)). See in this regard European
Commission, Recent Developments in the European Inter-Professional Social Dialogue
2002-3 (Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 2004) at 12-14).

18

See generally Chapter 35 of B. Bercusson, European Labour Law (Butterworths,
London, 1996).
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A. THE QUESTION OF OUTPUT LEGITIMACY
European social dialogue has been described by the Commission as “a
unique and indispensable component of the European social model”.19 It
was a process born of the need to make progress in the social field, since
serious difficulties were being encountered, at the time of its coming
about, in using the traditional method of Community legislation in getting
measures of a social nature through the Council of Ministers.20 It has been
referred to (not inaccurately) as “a tool for federalisation in all aspects of
economic and social questions”.21 Parallels can clearly be drawn with the
origins of the Open Method of Coordination, which was also born of
failure experienced in using certain other methods of cooperation at
European level. In terms of its ‘output legitimacy’, there can be no doubt
that the social dialogue has enjoyed successes. In terms of legislation, in
the close to fourteen years of its existence, cross-industry directives such
as the parental leave, part-time work and fixed-term contracts legislation
have been adopted, as well as sectoral directives concerning working time
both in sea transport and in civil aviation.22 Thus ‘the shadow of the law’
has in the past (at least on these occasions) seemed to give the social
19

See
the
Commission
website
at
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_dialogue/index_en.htm (18 January, 2007).

20

See contribution of J. Delors in European Commission, Twenty Years of European
Social Dialogue (Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 2006) at 12).

21

O. Quintin (Director-General for Employment and Social Affairs) in her foreword to
The Sectoral Social Dialogue in Europe (Directorate-General for Employment and Social
Affairs, European Commission, 2003)

22

Viz., Council Directive 1999/63/EC of 21 June 1999 concerning the Agreement on the
organisation of working time of seafarers concluded by the European Community
Shipowners' Association (ECSA) and the Federation of Transport Workers' Unions in the
European Union (FST) (OJ L 167 33 (2.7.1999)) and Council Directive 2000/79/EC of
27 November 2000 concerning the European Agreement on the Organisation of Working
Time of Mobile Workers in Civil Aviation concluded by the Association of European
Airlines (AEA), the European Transport Workers' Federation (ETF), the European
Cockpit Association (ECA), the European Regions Airline Association (ERA) and the
International Air Carrier Association (IACA) (OJ L 302 57 (1.12.2000)).
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partners sufficient incentive to negotiate. And yet a policy-making process
such as the social dialogue, which is grounded on consensus between the
social partners is clearly subject to major limits as a policy-making tool,
Not all policies can be adopted by consensus, and all social policies
adopted through this process are by definition subject to the veto of trade
unions, and, more significantly in the employment field, employers.
Moreover, there are definite limits to which the threat posed by the
‘shadow of the law’ can impel employers towards the negotiating table in
the social dialogue process, since (as with the draft Temporary Workers
Directive) it may be clear that insufficient consensus is unlikely to exist at
Council level for the adoption of a legislative measure in the area outside
the process of social dialogue. The social dialogue has known significant
failures in legislative terms. Thus for example, the social partners,
although consulted, declined to enter into negotiations on establishing
either European Works Councils or a general framework for informing
and consulting employees in the European Community, leaving the
Community legislative organs to negotiate and adopt both Directive
94/45/EC and Directive 2002/14/EC without them.23 Further, despite
engaging in extended negotiations on the Temporary Workers Directive,
they failed to reach any agreement. This failure has to date been more
significant than those concerning the European Works Council Directive
and the Framework Information and Consultation Directive, as the
Temporary Workers Directive has as yet failed to be adopted by the
Council using the normal legislative procedure).24 It may be an
exaggeration to describe the social dialogue as ‘marking time’ or as being

23

Directive 2002/14 /EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March
2002 establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in the
European Community (OJ L 80/29 (23.3.2002))and Council Directive 94/45/EC of 22
September 1994 on the establishment of a European Works Council or a procedure in
Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the
purposes of informing and consulting employees (OJ L 254/64 (30.9.1994)).

24

See now amended proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and the Council
on working conditions for temporary workers (COM/2002/0701 final)(Brussels, 28
November, 2002).
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‘bogged down’ 25 but there certainly seems to have been a significant step
away from the creation of hard law in its activities in recent years. Thus in
the Work Programme of the European Social Partners 2006-2008, the
social partners cite as notable achievements in the previous three years the
negotiation of “two framework agreements on telework and work-related
stress, two frameworks of actions on lifelong learning and gender equality
and [the development of] a programme to assist social partners of the new
Member States joining in the EU social dialogue. The perception of a
necessity to develop the Open Method of Coordination in the social field
could be regarded as an implicit admission that existing policy-making
tools in the social field—including the social dialogue have been
inadequate to achieve the Community’s goals. In recent years much focus
has been put on the sectoral aspect of the social dialogue and it is to this
topic it is now proposed to turn briefly.

B. THE SECTORAL ASPECT OF THE SOCIAL DIALOGUE
Less obvious than the cross-industry or inter-professional side of the social
dialogue (which has, after all, led to the most significant items of socialdialogue driven legislation, the parental leave, part-time work and fixedterm contracts directives) but by now responsible for much of any
dynamism which the social dialogue process manifests is its sectoral
aspect. The sectoral side of the social dialogue has seen very considerable
development since the Commission established the sectoral social
dialogue committees in 1998.26 By 2005, no less than 31 sectoral dialogue
committees were in place. A 2003 Commission document counted the
sectoral dialogue as having already given rise to 230 commitments of
different types and scale. Although this seems to be the last time such a
count was carried out, the number of such commitments has certainly risen
25

Criticisms referred to in the contribution of W. Beirnaert in European Commission,
Twenty Years of European Social Dialogue (Directorate-General for Employment and
Social Affairs, 2006) 16 at 18.

26

See in this regard Commission Communication COM (98) 322 final
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very considerably since then.27 A flavour of the varying natures of the
agreements reached by the social partners is given in the text below.28

C. THE INTERACTION OF SOCIAL DIALOGUE WITH OTHER
POLICY-MAKING TOOLS (SUCH AS LEGISLATION AND THE OPEN
METHOD OF COORDINATION) IN THE SOCIAL POLICY-MAKING
FIELD
A feature of social dialogue as a policy-making process has been the level
of interaction which its deployment has involved with other policy-making
processes, such as legislation or the Open Method of Coordination. The
most obvious example of its interaction with legislation is of course
provided by the use by the Commission and Council of Article 139 of the
EC Treaty to implement both cross-industry and sectoral agreements in the
form of directives—viz., the (cross-industry) parental leave, part-time
work and fixed-term contracts directives and the (sectoral) directives
concerning working time both in sea transport and in civil aviation.29
27

See for evidence of this the European Commission report, Recent Developments in the
European Sectoral Social Dialogue (Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs
and Equal Opportunities, 2005). Note also that the number of sectoral committees has
increased since 2003. The Commission web page (accessed in January 2006) asserted the
adoption of over 300 joint texts, although if the earlier figure given was correct, this
seems likely to be an underestimate.

28

See the text below under the heading, The Flexibility of Outcome Provided by the
Social Dialogue

29

Viz., Council Directive 1999/63/EC of 21 June 1999 concerning the Agreement on the
organisation of working time of seafarers concluded by the European Community
Shipowners' Association (ECSA) and the Federation of Transport Workers' Unions in the
European Union (FST) (OJ L 167 33 (2.7.1999)) and Council Directive 2000/79/EC of
27 November 2000 concerning the European Agreement on the Organisation of Working
Time of Mobile Workers in Civil Aviation concluded by the Association of European
Airlines (AEA), the European Transport Workers' Federation (ETF), the European
Cockpit Association (ECA), the European Regions Airline Association (ERA) and the
International Air Carrier Association (IACA) (OJ L 302 57 (1.12.2000)).
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However, cross-fertilisation with the legislative process also takes place in
ways other than the social partners simply seeking to influence the
Community legislature by having agreements reached by them
implemented in the form of legislation. Calls for legislative or foreign
policy action, support for existing legislative initiatives and consultation
on the content of legislation or the overall direction of Community social
policy can also play a role. Thus for example, the sectoral social dialogue
process has produced, variously an agreed declaration calling for
Community measures ensuring high standards in the private security
sector,30 a joint opinion in support of a Community legislative initiative in
the road transport area,31 the adoption of a clause for inclusion in the
protocols to fisheries agreements between the European Union and third
countries,32 a number of joint declarations by the social partners in the
construction industry for the Posted Workers Directive,33 the offering of
an (apparently influential) opinion on the draft Community ‘Everything
but Arms’ regulation by the social partners in the sugar industry 34 and a
common position by the social partners in the footwear industry on the
European social agenda.35 Social dialogue has also provided a means to
facilitate the increase of the policy-determining weight of the social
30

Agreement of 13 December, 2001 between European Confederation of Security
Services and UNI-Europa.

31

Joint opinion of 2002 by the International Road Transport Union and the European
Transport Workers’ Federation.

32

Adopted in 2001 by the Association of National Organisations of Fishing Enterprises
in the EU, the General Committee for Agricultural Cooperation in the EU (EuropêcheCogeca) and the European Transport Workers’ Federation.

33

European Commission, The Sectoral Social Dialogue in Europe (Directorate-General
for Employment and Social Affairs, 2003) at 25.

34

Council Regulation (EC) No 2820/98 of 21 December 1998 applying a multiannual
scheme of generalised tariff preferences for the period 1 July 1999 to 31 December 2001
(OJ L 134 1-109 (29.5.2003)). See European Commission, The Sectoral Social Dialogue
in Europe (Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 2003) at 40.

35

Ibid., at 27.
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partners and/or to mobilise politically. Hence, for example, in 2001, the
relevant partners in the tourism, hotels, restaurants and cafés sector signed
a joint declaration on the effects of VAT on activities and employment in
this sector and presented joint declarations in favour of a reduced rate of
VAT as well as a common position on the Commission communication on
tourism.36 In the railways sector, the social partners concluded a
memorandum of understanding with the European Association for
Railway Interoperability in order to ensure the involvement of the partners
in the drawing up of technical specifications for interoperability.37
The social dialogue has also been used in conjunction with the Open
Method of Coordination in order to achieve policy goals. The first
apparent example of this seems to have been the framework of actions for
the lifelong development of competencies and qualifications which was
presented by the social partners to the Barcelona European Council in
March 2002 (as a contribution to the achievement of the Lisbon strategy)
and which identified a number of priorities in the field of lifelong learning.
The signatory social parties agreed to implement the framework through
an Open Method of Coordination—“in other words by establishing goals
or guidelines at European level using the open method of coordination,
which are followed up by regular national reports and systematic
assessment of progress achieved in their implementation.” By 2005, no
less three follow-up reports had been published by the social partners,
although the degree of success constituted by this has to be judged in the
light of the reality the results achieved by this process seem to have varied
very considerably from one member state to another.38

36

COM (2001) 665 final (13 November, 2001).

37

See European Commission, The Sectoral Social Dialogue in Europe (DirectorateGeneral for Employment and Social Affairs, 2003) at 36.

38

For the third of these reports, see http://www.etuc.org/a/901
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D. THE FLEXIBILITY
DIALOGUE

OF

OUTCOME PROVIDED

BY THE

15

SOCIAL

An extraordinary range of agreed outcomes, both legislative and
otherwise, has been given rise to by the process of social dialogue. The
flexibility of outcomes which may be given rise to by the social dialogue
process constitutes a factor which this process has in common with the
Open Method of Coordination. In some respects, the variety of outcomes
reflects the variety of circumstances driving such agreements. Thus
agreements reached by the social partners may be own-initiative
undertakings, or they may stem from the process of consultation by the
Commission under Article 138.39
In terms of legislation, as has already been noted, cross-industry directives
such as the parental leave, part-time work and fixed-term contracts
legislation have been the outcome of the inter-professional social dialogue,
while the sectoral social dialogue has given rise to directives concerning
working time both in sea transport and in civil aviation.40
In terms of agreements, the content tends to range from mere general
recommendations to commitments to precise action, accompanied by
monitoring systems. Included in the gamut of measures which have been
agreed under the sectoral social dialogue are (by way of example)

39

According to the Commission, they may also stem from the application of Community
decisions or directives. See European Commission, The Sectoral Social Dialogue in
Europe (Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 2003) at 8.
40

Viz., Council Directive 1999/63/EC of 21 June 1999 concerning the Agreement on the
organisation of working time of seafarers concluded by the European Community
Shipowners' Association (ECSA) and the Federation of Transport Workers' Unions in the
European Union (FST) (OJ L 167 33 (2.7.1999)) and Council Directive 2000/79/EC of
27 November 2000 concerning the European Agreement on the Organisation of Working
Time of Mobile Workers in Civil Aviation concluded by the Association of European
Airlines (AEA), the European Transport Workers' Federation (ETF), the European
Cockpit Association (ECA), the European Regions Airline Association (ERA) and the
International Air Carrier Association (IACA) (OJ L 302 57 (1.12.2000)).
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recommended standards of conduct in the hairdressing industry,41 as well
as the circulation of a teaching CD-ROM aimed at tutors and pupils for the
purposes of testing the skills of apprentice hairdressers,42 an agreed
declaration calling for Community measures ensuring high standards in
the private security sector,43 a joint opinion in support of a legislative
initiative in the road transport area,44 voluntary guidelines concerning age
diversity and work in the commercial field,45 agreed guidelines for
teleworking,46 a report on the concept of employability in the railways
sector,47 the publication of a health and safety good practice guide for
small- and medium-sized undertakings in the construction sector, 48
common positions concerning the ratification of International Labour
41

Agreement reached in 2001 between the International Hairdressing Confederation and
the International Hairdressing Union.

42

The social partners in the sugar sector (viz., the European Committee of Sugar
Manufacturers and the European Federation of Food, Agriculture and Tourism Trade
Unions) similarly produced a training CD-ROM—the Leonardo kit—which was intended
to help prevent industrial accidents. (See European Commission, The Sectoral Social
Dialogue in Europe (Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 2003) at
40).

43

Agreement of 13 December, 2001 between European Confederation of Security
Services and UNI-Europa.

44

Joint opinion of 2002 by the International Road Transport Union and the European
Transport Workers’ Federation.

45

Agreement of 11 March 2002 between Eurocommerce and Uni-Europa.

46

Agreement of February 2001 between UNI-Europa
Telecommunications Network Operators' Association.

47

and

the

European

Report published in November 2001 by a working party from the sectoral social
dialogue committee for the railways sector (on the basis of a survey carried out amoung a
number of European railway companies).

48

Drawn up in December 2002 by the FIEC and the EFBWW_.
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Organisation conventions in the sea transport field, 49 the adoption of a
clause for inclusion in the protocols to fisheries agreements between the
European Union and third countries,50 and the offering of an opinion on
the Community ‘Everything but Arms’ regulation.51
This is to offer but a very small sample—although an illustrative one—of
the variety of agreed outcomes which have emerged from the social
dialogue process.
There is also at least one sense in which the outcome capable of being
produced by social dialogue is variable in a negative sense, however. The
Commission’s own estimate is that the rate of coverage by agreements
which are not translated into legislation is “approximately 80%” of
workers and undertakings, a figure which is partly owed to the
incorporation of agreements into business agreements and the use of
extension procedures or mechanisms in a significant number of countries.
Even accepting this figure, this is significantly smaller than the percentage
of workers and undertakings capable (if at times only in a technical sense)
of being reached by legislation. In addition, the proportion of workers and
undertakings covered varies wildly from one member state to another—
from 95% in Austria and Finland to a mere 30% in the United Kingdom.52
49

Agreed between the European Community Shipowners’ Association and the European
Transport Workers’ Federation. See European Commission, The Sectoral Social
Dialogue in Europe (Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 2003) at
39.

50

Adopted in 2001 by the Association of National Organisations of Fishing Enterprises
in the EU, the General Committee for Agricultural Cooperation in the EU (EuropêcheCogeca) and the European Transport Workers’ Federation.

51

Council Regulation (EC) No 2820/98 of 21 December 1998 applying a multiannual
scheme of generalised tariff preferences for the period 1 July 1999 to 31 December 2001
(OJ L 134 1-109 (29.5.2003)).

52

Figures quoted from European Commission, The Sectoral Social Dialogue in Europe
(Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 2003) at 6 (in which reliance
was made on the report Industrial Relations in Europe 2002).
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The effectiveness of the social dialogue as a policy-making tool in the
absence of implementing legislation under Article 139 must clearly be
judged in the light of such figures.

E. THE SOCIAL DIALOGUE AS AN EVOLVING PROCESS
A feature of the social dialogue process has been its evolving nature.
Again, this is something which this process has in common with the Open
Method of Coordination. The Commission Communications of 1998
(entitled Adapting and promoting the social dialogue at Community level)
and 2002 (entitled The European social dialogue, a force for innovation
and change) were conscious attempts to push this process of development
onwards. Thus the former document set out the basis of the establishment,
composition and functioning of sectoral social dialogue committees. The
latter document aimed at improving existing structures and promoting
more effective dialogue, including by reinforcing the role of the ‘liaison
forum’, which is a bipartite arena for informing and consulting both
sectoral and cross-industry social partner organisations at European level,
which meets several times a year at the invitation of the Commission.53
Numerous significant recent steps in the process of evolution can be
pointed out—the establishment, for example, of the ‘liaison forum’ and
the establishment of multi-annual work programmes beginning in the
period 2003-2005. Were one to look more broadly at the history of the
social dialogue, then two, perhaps three distinct periods of evolution could
be identified. The first would consist of the period from 1985 to 1993,
which marked the beginning of cross-industry social dialogue. The second
would be seen as having begun with the coming into force of the
Maastricht Treaty and the associated Social Policy Agreement, at which
time the possibility of legislative implementation of agreements between
the social partners came about. According to the Commission, a third
period of evolution, characterised by growth in independence and
autonomy of the social partners can be seen to have begun at the Laeken
53

Ibid., at 11. The role of the liaison forum was set out in the Commission’s 2002
Communication, The Social Dialogue, a force for innovation and change (COM(2002)
341 final).
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European Council in 2001 (where the social partners presented a joint
contribution) and characterised by multi-annual work programmes and
less focus on implementation of agreements through legislation.54

F. A MAJOR ROLE FOR THE COMMISSION
The major role of the Commission is very much reflected in the relevant
Treaty provisions concerning the social dialogue. Thus under Article 138
of the EC Treaty, the Commission is given the task of promoting the
consultation of management and labour at Community level and of taking
any relevant measure to facilitate their dialogue by ensuring balanced
support for the parties.55 It is the Commission which is to consult
management and labour on the possible direction of Community action,
before submitting proposals in the social policy field, 56 and the
Commission which must consult management and labour on the content of
the envisaged proposal, should it consider Community action advisable,
after such initial consultation (and of course to the Commission that
management and labour are required to forward the relevant opinion or,
where appropriate, a recommendation).57 Should the social partners wish
to take control of the process, it is the Commission they inform of their
wish to initiate the Article 139 procedure. The Commission then has a
power of co-decision (with the social partners on whether to extend the
usual nine month limit to the duration of Article 139 dialogue.58
54

See e.g, See European Commission, Recent Developments in the European InterProfessional Social Dialogue 2002-3 (Directorate-General for Employment and Social
Affairs, 2004) at 6.

55

Article 138(1) of the EC Treaty.

56

Article 138(2) of the EC Treaty.

57

Article 138(3) of the EC Treaty.

58

Article 138(4) of the EC Treaty.
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Agreements reached by the social partners under Article 139 can only be
implemented via Council decision if this is “on a proposal from the
Commission”.59
Of course, the use of social dialogue extends beyond its use to create
agreements envisaged in Article 139. Whatever the use to which it is put,
however, the Commission, has had in the past—and seems to retain —
considerable importance in the development of the dialogue—a point
which this policy-making tool has in common with the Open Method of
Coordination.60 Thus, for example, it has been acknowledged from the
side of management that the Maastricht Social Policy Agreement—very
much the birth certificate of the social dialogue process—“would never
have seen the light of day” “if it had not been for the creativity and
obstinacy of Jacques Delors”.61 (Sight should not be lost of the fact that
the Val Duchesse process which preceded it from 1985 onwards was also
Commission-driven). On a more ongoing basis, the experience of ETUC
has been that “the social dialogue has done better whenever the European
Commission has maintained a high profile and a strong initiative in the
social sphere.” 62 The evolutionary process which the social dialogue has
undergone (and which has been referred to in the text above) has been
very much supported and assisted by the Commission 63—and the
59

Article 139(2) of the EC Treaty.

60

Note the precedent for the role of the Commission provided by Monnet’s creation, the
Commissariat du Plan, on which, interestingly, both Jacques Delors and Jacques Fournier
(then President of CEEP) had worked in 1960s France. (See contribution of J. Fournier
in European Commission, Twenty Years of European Social Dialogue (DirectorateGeneral for Employment and Social Affairs, 2006) at 19).
61

See contribution of W. Beirnaert in European Commission, Twenty Years of European
Social Dialogue (Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 2006) at 16.
62

See contribution of E. Gabaglio (former General Secretary of ETUC) in European
Commission, Twenty Years of European Social Dialogue (Directorate-General for
Employment and Social Affairs, 2006) at 15.

63

As is testified to by the publication of the Commission of its 2002 and 2004
Communications, The Social Dialogue, a force for innovation and change (COM(2002)
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Commission’s role continues to be significant in new forms which social
dialogue takes.64 (Hence, for example, it is the Commission which takes
the initiative concerning the meetings of the social partners’ liaison
forum). And not to be forgotten is the crucial financial support provided
for the process of social dialogue by the Commission. Thus for example
by 2003 the sectoral social dialogue was being provided with significant
financial support by the Commission (totalling over 28 million euro)
distributed under three separate budget lines.65

G. THE QUESTION OF INPUT LEGITIMACY—WHO GETS
NEGOTIATE AND HOW REPRESENTATIVE ARE THEY?

TO

If a question mark is to be put over the social dialogue process, perhaps
the obvious place in which to put it concerns its ‘input legitimacy’. Thus,
for example, under Article 139, nobody but ‘management and labour’ is
given the right to negotiate agreements. Who the representatives of
management and labour are is left—subject to not-over rigorous judicial
control 66—to the Commission. In fairness, the Commission appears to
341 final) and Partnership for change in an enlarged Europe—Enhancing the role of
European Social Dialogue (COM(2004) 557 final).
64

Note for example the Commission role in the sectoral social dialogue committees in
preparing meetings, agendas and in following up work previously validated at plenary
meetings. (See European Commission, The Sectoral Social Dialogue in Europe
(Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 2003) at 11).

65

Budget line B3-4000 (established to promote development of social dialogue at crossindustry and sectoral levels), B3-4002 (which was intended to fund training and
information measures for worker organisations) and B3-4003 (which was aimed in
particular at funding measures to strengthen transnational cooperation by workers’ and
employer’s representatives with regard to information and consultation in undertakings
operating in a number of member states). See generally European Commission, The
Sectoral Social Dialogue in Europe (Directorate-General for Employment and Social
Affairs, 2003) at 12.

66

See Case T-135/96 Union Européenne de l’Artisanat et des Petites et Moyennes
Entreprises (UEAPME) v. Council of the European Union [1998] ECR II-2335 in which
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display very considerable sensitivity to the point that representativeness
and input legitimacy more generally is key to (if not the Achille’s heel of)
the social dialogue in terms of its legitimacy. Such sensitivity manifests
itself in the acknowledgment by the Commission that “representativeness
is obviously essential for the legitimacy of the social dialogue” 67 and in
the fact that whenever an application to set up a committee is made, the
Commission sends the social partner organisations involved a
questionnaire enabling them to evaluate, inter alia, the level of their own
representativeness.68 It manifests itself in the fact that the Commission
commissions continuing research in order to enable it to monitor the
representativeness of European social partner organisations.69 Further, it is
to be seen in the fact that the Commission has also established objective
criteria which must be met in order for social partner organisations to be
considered eligible for consultation viz., that the organisations must (i) be
cross-industry, or relate to specific sectors or categories and be organised
at European level; (ii) consist of organisations which are themselves an
integral and recognised part of Member States' social partner structures
and with the capacity to negotiate agreements, and which are
representative of all Member States, as far as possible; and (iii) have
adequate structures to ensure the effective participation in the consultation
the Court of First Instance stipulated that it was essential that the signatories of an
agreement, taken together, were sufficiently representative to justify the Council
converting the agreement into a Directive. The ruling is analysed in E. Franssen and A.
Jacobs, “The Question of Representativity in the European Social Dialogue” (1998) 35
CMLRev 1295.
67

See e.g., the European Commission, The Sectoral Social Dialogue in Europe
(Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 2003) at 11

68

69

Ibid.

See European Commission, Recent Developments in the European Inter-Professional
Social Dialogue 2002-3 (Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 2004)
at 15 and European Commission, Recent Developments in the European Sectoral Social
Dialogue (Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities,
2005) at 5. The relevant research is carried out by the Institute of Labour Sciences at the
Catholic University of Louvain and much of it is available at
http://www.uclouvain.be/en-11476.html
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process.70 Overall, approximately fifty such organisations are said to meet
these criteria,71 but at cross-industry level, the number of players is much
smaller: workers are represented at European by the European Trade
Union Confederation (ETUC), which represents 77 member organisations
in 35 European countries,72 and has a total of 60 million members.73
European employers are represented by the Union of Industrial and
Employers' Confederations of Europe (UNICE), which represents the
employers' organisations of 27 European countries,74 and by the European
Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation and of Enterprises of
General Economic Interest (CEEP). In practice, the number of parties
which have been involved in negotiating European-level agreements
seems to have been kept smaller than the number who have been consulted
about initiatives in the social policy field.75

70

The three criteria of representativeness were defined by the Commission in its
communication of 1993 (COM (93) 600 final), and taken up again in further
communiciations in 1996 (COM (96) 448 final) and 1998 (COM (98) 322 final). (See
Commission
social
dialogue
website
at
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_dialogue/represent_en.htm).

71

Ibid. See for a list of these the annex to the 2002 Commission Communication COM
(2002) 341 final.

72

In addition to eleven European associations of trade unions.

73

Other trade union bodies operate under the auspices of ETUC, which additionally
liaises with certain other European trade union bodies.

74

The small- and medium-sized enterprises body UEAPME (Union européenne de
l'artisanat et des petites et moyennes entreprises) participates in the European social
dialogue as part of the UNICE delegation.

75

According to Betten, in practice, the number of partners who are regarded as capable of
concluding agreements is more limited than the number regarded as qualifying for
consultation. (See L. Betten, “The Democratic Deficit of Participatory Democracy in
Community Social Policy” (1998) 23 European Law Review 20 at 30-31. Interestingly,
the Commission website describes the circa. fifty organisations having the legitimacy to
be consulted in conformity with article 138 of the Treaty as only “possibly” having the
legitimacy
to
enter
negotiations
(see
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Concern about the representativeness of those of the social partners which
have actually negotiated agreements has led to (unsuccessful) litigation in
the past.76 The Commission has stressed the embeddedness of both
employer and employees representatives in industry in addition to their
mandate from their affiliated organisations as providing them with the
authority to speak on behalf of employers or the workforce as the case
may be.77 But concern has been expressed by some commentators that
although UNICE, CEEP and ETUC are the most representative
organisations of their kind, they still can not claim to represent a majority
of employers and workers.78 There is also the broader issue of the nonrepresentation of parties, other than management and (employed) labour
who are affected by social legislation. Thus, for example, legislation
which creates higher employment for workers may be argued to have

http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_dialogue/represent_en.htm)
and
has
acknowledged that the requirement of representativeness will be stricter in the case of a
negotiated agreement than for a simple consultation. (See European Commission, The
Sectoral Social Dialogue in Europe (Directorate-General for Employment and Social
Affairs, 2003) at 11).
76

See Case T-135/96 Union Européenne de l’Artisanat et des Petites et Moyennes
Entreprises (UEAPME) v. Council of the European Union [1998] ECR II-2335. Compare
the similarly unsuccessful earlier litigation (concerning appointments to the Consultative
Committee of the ECSC) Case 66-76 Confédération française démocratique du travail
(CFDT) v Council of the European Communities [1977] ECR 305.

77

See European Commission, Recent Developments in the European Sectoral Social
Dialogue (Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities,
2005) at 6.

78

See L. Betten, “The Democratic Deficit of Participatory Democracy in Community
Social Policy” (1998) 23 European Law Review 20 at 32. On the question of
representativeness, note also
E. Franssen and A. Jacobs, “The Question of Representativity in the European Social
Dialogue” (1998) 35 CMLRev 1295.
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economic implications for the unemployed. And issues of parental rights
affect even ‘non-working’ parents.
It is only fair to note that (as already mentioned in the text above) social
dialogue exists both in bipartite form (involving a dialogue only between
the social partners, which is what is involved under Article 38 of the EC
Treaty) and tripartite form (which involves dialogue not only between the
social partners but with public authorities as well). In the latter case,
problems of representativeness are less, since the interests of parties not
represented by the social partners may be capable of being represented by
the public authorities involved. In this regard, it is of interest that socalled tripartite concertation has been taking place since 2003 on both the
political and the technical level in relation to macroeconomics,
employment, social protection and education and training since the setting
up of the Tripartite Social Summit, which, as noted above, consists of the
Presidency of the Council (plus the two subsequent Presidencies, the
Commission and the social partners, represented at the highest level).79

H. THE WEAK ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
SOCIAL DIALOGUE PROCESS

IN THE

Arguably inextricably linked to the question of the legitimacy of the social
dialogue process is the minor role accorded to the European Parliament in
this process. It is not true to say that the European Parliament is entirely
excluded from any role in practice, since it would appear that it is
informed about proposals at least when they are at an early stage,80 and
79

See Council Decision 2003/174/EC of 6 March 2003 establishing a Tripartite Social
Summit for Growth and Employment (OJ L 070 31 (14.03.2003)). See in this regard
European Commission, Recent Developments in the European Inter-Professional Social
Dialogue 2002-3 (Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 2004) at 1214.

80

L. Betten, loc. cit., n. 79 above, at 32, citing the 1993 Commission Communication
COM (93) 600. In addition, should the social dialogue process be entirely successful,
then legislation adopted by the ‘normal’ route will involve Parliament having its usual
role.
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also that it is in practice asked its opinion on any social partners’
agreement which it is proposed to implement by way of legislation.81 But
these are matters of practice rather than legal entitlement. Officially, “the
only institution which represents and is chosen by all the peoples of the
EU, is excluded from the legislative process of [Article 139(2)]”.82 The
process largely bypasses the European Parliament.
Unsurprisingly, the European Parliament itself has long asked for a power
of codecision so that, like the Council, it too could reject or approve any
proposal in the social dialogue field.83 Given that this corresponds to the
usual conception of democracy at European level, it seems somewhat
anomalous that it is an approach which has not yet been acceded to. Until
it is, legitimacy in the parliamentary sense might perhaps be sought in the
control by national parliaments of their executives in the Council of
Ministers is not addressed in this article. But in reality, very considerable
difficulties exist with the exercise of such control in most, if not all,
member states. 84 Further, such control will be by definition absent in the
case of an outvoted member state, wherever a qualified majority vote is
taken to implement an agreement of the social partners by Community
legislation (a possibility which exists under Article 139(2) of the EC
Treaty). Interestingly, the process of social dialogue has been described
from within the Commission as “the product of a long democratic tradition
shared by all Member States of the European Union” 85 and the assertion
81

See E. Franssen and A. Jacobs, “The Question of Representativity in the European
Social Dialogue” (1998) 35 CMLRev 1295 at 1305.

82

Ibid.

83

See resolution EP T4-0413/1997 of 18 July 1997 (OJ C286 325-338 (22.09.1997))

84

See in relation to this topic G. Barrett (ed.), National Parliaments and the European
Union: The Constitutional Challenge for the Oireachtas and Other Member State
Legislatures (Clarus Press, Dublin, 2007, forthcoming)

85

See O. Quintin, Foreword to European Commission, The Sectoral Social Dialogue in
Europe (Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 2003) at 3
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made that “in an innovative way, the social dialogue forms part of the
democratic governance of Europe”.86 A rights-based vocabulary has also
been used, whereby the social dialogue is described as “a component of
fundamental social rights”.87 In some ways, such claims are perhaps not
implausible, given the impressively increased involvement of the social
partners brought about by the process of social dialogue in determining the
rules which are to govern their members. At the same time, it must be
acknowledged that whatever democratic legitimacy the social dialogue
process has apparently stems (at least to date) from a non-parliamentary
concept of democracy.

I. THE LACK OF TRANSPARENCY
Linked perhaps to the question of representativeness is the question of
transparency. Supposedly, law should be made in public. Pressure has
increased in recent years for the Council to be more open when it is
exercising its law-making role. It may seem curious therefore to have set
up—relatively recently—a system which can lead to the adoption of, inter
alia, Community directives, and yet in which transparency is limited,
except perhaps to those directly involved in policy-making in this way.

86

European Commission, The Sectoral Social Dialogue in Europe (Directorate-General
for Employment and Social Affairs, 2003) at 7. Beirnaert asserts that “the Social
Dialogue plays a major role in democracy by associating the kinetic forces of the
economy with the definition of a socio-economic policy”. See W. Beirnaert, European
Commission, Twenty Years of European Social Dialogue (Directorate-General for
Employment and Social Affairs, 2006) at 18.

87

Ibid., at 13.
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J. THE LACK OF OPENNESS TO OTHER VOICES ONCE
AGREEMENT IS REACHED BY THE SOCIAL PARTNERS

AN

The flexibility of the social dialogue process in terms of the outcomes
which it is capable of producing has been adverted to in the text above.
However, in at least one way the social dialogue process has produced an
outcome which is remarkably inflexible—viz., there seems to be little
room for input from any other party or institution once agreement has been
reached by the social partners. Even the Commission and the Council who
are given an express role by Article 139 seem unwilling or unable to use
this role in order to amend in any way agreements reached by the social
partners. As Franssen and Jacobs note, “it is the social partners who are
responsible for the detailed contents of the Directive, as the Council seems
to refrain from amending the text and to restrict itself to adopting or
rejecting the agreement” 88 This has led to a situation in which “the social
partners are absolute masters over the contents of an agreement [but] the
Community institutions still decide whether they want to turn those
contents into Community law”.89 This may be seen as linked to the
question of representativeness, discussed above, since it means that only
the views of the social partners will ever be reflected in a European-level
agreement that is converted into Community law under the procedure
provided by Article 139.

K. THE CHALLENGE OF EASTERN ENLARGEMENT
Starting with the EFTA enlargement in 1995, countries acceding to the
European Community have had not only had to receive the legislative
acquis communautaire into their systems, but have also had to incorporate
what may be called the social dialogue acquis at both sectoral and intersectoral level. The May 2004 (and now January 2007) enlargements of the
European Community have presented major challenges to the use of the
88

Loc. cit., n. 82 above, at 1306.

89

Betten, loc. cit., n. 79 above, at 33.
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social dialogue in the social policy area, inter alia, because of the lack of
the necessary infrastructure (in the form of properly functioning
independent trade union and employer organisations) in many of the
former Eastern bloc countries to take part in the social dialogue process.
Thus the Commission has referred to
the inherent weakness of structures for bilateral dialogue in
most of the acceding countries, in addition to a number of other
problems including low and frequently declining rates of
unionisation, poor levels of recruitment amongst employers’
organisations, fragmentation of the employers’ and trade union
organisations in some cases, and limited financial resources, all
against the backdrop of an unfavourable economic climate.90
Problems such as these obviously seriously hinder participation in the
European social dialogue process (whether at inter-professional or at
sectoral level) by social partners from the newly-acceded member states.91

III. DEPLOYING THE CLASSIC ‘COMMUNITY
METHOD’: REFLECTIONS ON ONE PROMINENT
EXAMPLE OF LEGISLATION IN THE SOCIAL POLICY
FIELD—THE ACQUIRED RIGHTS DIRECTIVE
At the core of Community social policy for much of its existence has been
(and in many areas remains) the Community method of legislation. Much
of Community social policy is effected via the adoption of legislation,
90

European Commission, Recent Developments in the European Inter-Professional
Social Dialogue 2002-3 (Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 2004)
at 24.

91

Indeed, they cause difficulties even beyond this sphere, since a whole range of
Community directives dealing with everything from health and safety to information and
consultation now require the involvement of social partners.
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normally in the form of a directive (defined as an instrument which “shall
be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to
which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice
of form and methods”) or, less usually a regulation, (which “shall have
general application” and “shall be binding in its entirety and directly
applicable in all Member States.”) 92
A comprehensive comparative analysis of the usefulness of using
Community legislation for the purposes of attaining objectives in the
social field is a task beyond the aims of this brief paper. It is proposed
nonetheless to offer some observations concerning one significant
example of the Community method of legislation in the social policy field
viz., regarding the Acquired Rights Directive, a measure which has given
rise to a volume of European Court of Justice rulings second in the
employment field only to that produced by Community equality law and
to ask what (if any) lessons can be learned from the experience of having
used this legislation as a policy-making instrument in the social field. This
is done by examining the operation of the Acquired Rights Directive both
from a general perspective and from the particular perspective of the
implementation experience of one particular member state—in this case,
Ireland—with comments which are founded on the experience of the
operation of implementing legislation in this particular country forming
the latter part of the text which follows.93

92

Article 249 of the EC Treaty. Note now in particular Paragraphs (a) to (i) of Article
137(1) of the EC Treaty which lists fields within the area of employment law in which
directives may establish minimum requirements for gradual implementation. (See in this
regard Article 137(2)(b) of the EC Treaty.

93

The reason for this writer’s interest in this legislation in particular stems in part from
my undertaking a recent study of the operation of the Directive generally, and later
having been asked to examine the Irish implementation for a recent study for the
European Commission, The Implementation and Application of EU Labour Law
Directives in the Enlarged European Union. This study was submitted sub. nom. Report
on Implementation by Ireland of Directive 2001/23/EC on the Approximation of Laws of
the Member States Relating to the Safeguarding of Employees’ rights in the Event of
Transfers of Undertakings, Businesses or Parts of Businesses.
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What lessons, if any, are to be drawn from the manner in which the
Acquired Rights Directive originated or has evolved in the thirty years of
its existence in one form or another ? 94 Looking first (insofar as this is
possible) at the general European level, a number of observations on how
this legislation has been formed or operated seem apposite, although
naturally care must be exercised regarding the extent to which such
remarks may be generalised to legislation in the social policy field
generally.

B. ADOPTING AND AMENDING ACQUIRED RIGHTS LEGISLATION:
THE WATERING DOWN OF AMBITIONS, THE REACHING OF
UNSATISFACTORY COMPROMISES AND THE USE OF LEGISLATION
AS A PUBLIC RELATIONS EXERCISE
A striking feature of the adoption of the original Acquired Rights
Directive 95 and of its subsequent amendment in 1998 96 has been the very
94

For an analysis of most recent case-law of the European Court of Justice in this area,
see G. Barrett, “Light Acquired on Acquired Rights - A Survey of Recent Developments
in the Law on Transfers of Undertakings” (2005) 42 CMLR 1053, and for some more
recent reflections on some other recent case-law in this area, see by the same writer,
“Celtec: Asking the Court of a Justice for a Date or The Limits of Consensual Behaviour
in Privatisations” (2005) 30 ELR 600 and “‘Shall I Compare Thee To…?’ On Article 141
EC and Lawrence” (2006) 35 ILJ 93.
95

Council Directive 77/187/EEC of 14 February 1977 on the approximation of the laws
of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of
transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses (OJ L 61, 5.3.1977, p. 26).

96

By Council Directive 98/50/EC of 29 June 1998 amending Directive 77/187/EEC on
the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of
employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of
businesses (OJ L 201, 17.7.1998, p. 88). Directive 98/50/EC was subsequently repealed
by Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of
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considerable dilution of the original draft legislation as proposed by the
European Commission when compared to the legislation in its final form
Such dilution has been well documented in the case of the original
Directive by Hepple,97 who noted the very considerable reduction in the
scope of ambition of the proposal from its original Commission draft in
1974 to the legislation ultimately adopted in the form of Directive 77/187
by the Council. (An example was the elimination, by the time the
Directive was adopted, of its application to certain share transfer
situations, an alteration which robbed the Directive of a great deal of its
significance and capacity to protect workers at national level, most
particularly in the United Kingdom and Ireland, where large numbers of
business transfers have always been carried out by this method. Similarly
eliminated was the provision in Article 8 of the original Commission draft
of Directive 77/187 that, if negotiations between employers and workers’
representatives failed to secure agreement between the parties within a
period of two months, each could refer the matter to an arbitration board
which “shall give a binding decision as to what measures shall be taken
for the benefit of the workers”. Although the 1977 Directive was adopted
under procedures requiring a unanimous vote in Council_, and some of the
blame for the watering-down of the original proposal may be attributed to
the requirement of unanimity which applied in relation to the adoption of
this proposal,98 it is not clear that the entirety of the such responsibility can
be straightforwardly ascribed to this cause. Thus, for example, the number
of votes actually called in legislative matters at Council level has
historically been so low as to make clear that legislation has tended to be
adopted by consensus at Council level even where the legislative
procedure under the EC Treaty involves qualified majority voting, and
the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of
transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses (OJ L 82,
22.3.2001, p. 16).
97

B. Hepple, “Workers’ Rights in Mergers and Takeovers: The EEC Proposals” (1976) 5
ILJ 197 and see also the note by the same writer on the Acquired Rights Directive in
(1977) 6 ILJ 106.

98

The ultimate shape of the Framework Equality Directive was also affected by this
requirement, particularly insofar as concerned discrimination on grounds of religion.
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even where such a qualified majority exists.99 In addition, other factors
seem to be at work: the normal give-and-take of negotiation between any
parties with widely disparate interests would in any case be expected tend
to lead in the direction of conclusions of more general nature. In
particular, the very different collective labour law traditions of the
member states would militate against very strong provisions in the
collective employment law field. This last factor is one which probably
accounts for the particular weakness of the information and consultation
provisions of the Acquired Rights Directive.100 Acute awareness on the
part of the member states of the binding nature of the outcome of the
bargaining process may also be a factor. In addition, sight should not be
lost of the point that on occasion member states may be as interested in
being seen to act as in actually acting: legislation may be adopted as an
indication to the public that something is being done about a particular
issue, even if in reality the content of the measure is severely lacking. This
is, in effect, the phenomenon of adopting legislation in whole or in part as
a public relations exercise. The occurrence of this at national level has
been noted by O’Hegarty 101 and it is not merely cynicism to suggest that
there is probably an element of this at European level too. As regards the
Acquired Rights Directive in particular, it may be noted that in 1977, the
EEC was still under lingering (if somewhat dissipating) pressure to
demonstrate via the fulfilment of its social action programme that the
99

See in this regard the Commission White Paper on Governance.

100

It is interesting to note that the individual employment law provisions of the Directive
rather than the collective employment law ones have given rise to almost all of the
litigation to have reached the European Court of Justice (with Case C-382/92
Commission v. United Kingdom [1994] ECR I-2435 being the exception which probes,
rather than proves, this particular rule). In part this may be because rules of the latter kind
are less likely to be litigated, but it may also be because collective labour law is a ‘tough
law’ area in which transnational legal provisions are much less likely to be effective,
which is certainly the Irish experience of the implementation of the collective law
provisions of the Directive (as to which, see more below).
101

See the chapter by L. O’Hegarty in G. Barrett (ed.), National Parliaments and the
European Union: The Constitutional Challenge for the Oireachtas and Other Member
State Legislatures (Clarus Press, Dublin, 2007, forthcoming) in which this observation is
made in the context of the European Union (Scrutiny) Act 2002.
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Community attached as much significance to its social objectives as to its
market objectives, and the adoption even of a proposal relating to acquired
rights even in severely weakened form served this end.102 Similarly,
securing elusive agreement of all the member states in 1998 on the
amending Directive 98/50 103 was a notable success for the then British
Presidency of the Council of Ministers at that time in its final days, even it
is clear that for some states, copperfastening in Community law the test
formulated in Süzen 104 for the transfer of an undertaking, as Directive
98/50 did, must in terms of its substance have been an unsatisfactory
compromise (given that it was for long a key issue preventing agreement
on the amending directive). And yet it was agreed to, once it was clear no
other compromise would be accepted, and once the Court of Justice had
solved a key part of the political dilemma for the member states by
interpreting Directive 77/187 in such a way as to transform the enterprise
organisation concept of the undertaking into a politically convenient status
quo of European law.
The weakening of Commission employment law proposals in the
employment law field once they reach the Council of Ministers is now a
less regularly-seen phenomenon than was formerly the case. At least part
of the reason for this, however, has been the appearance of an alternative
law-generating mechanism in the form of Article 139 agreements between
the social partners under the social dialogue process. The adoption of the
bulk of legislative measures in the employment law field now involves
only the adoption of Directives with the (normally unamended) text of
such an agreement attached—a method of policy-furtherance which thus
escapes some of the disadvantages linked to adopting legislation following
102

See Council resolution of 21 January 1974 concerning a social action programme (OJ
No C 13, 12.2.1974, p. 1)._
103

Council Directive 98/50/EC of 29 June 1998 amending Directive 77/187/EEC on the
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of
employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of
businesses (OJ L 201, 17.7.1998, p. 88)
104

Case C-13/95 Süzen [1997] ECR I-1259.
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the procedure used to adopt and amend the Acquired Rights Directive and
which is examined further in the text below.
Although insofar as concerns the adoption of the Acquired Rights regime,
the dilution process was a marked one, at least some of the consequences
of such dilution may not be permanent. Even initially emasculated or
otherwise unsatisfactory legislation may constitute a start in a more longterm sequence of events—a foot in the door which, once held ajar even to
a narrow extent, can later be pushed further open when circumstances are
more propitious—something which can be said to have already happened
in the case of the Acquired Rights Directive, since its present (2001) form
is the result not just of the original 1977 legislation, but of improving
amendments made in 1998 (and consolidated in the 2001 measure), in
addition to the strengthening input of the jurisprudence of the European
Court of Justice. Further, a process of reform which is presently in its very
early stages seems likely to lead to further amendments and improvements
within some years—although as of yet, it is worthy of note there seems to
be no intention to apply the Directive to share transfer situations or to
attach to resolve disputes concerning the information and consultation
provisions in the manner envisaged in the original 1974 Commission draft
Directive.

C. THE DIFFICULTY OF CHANGING DIRECTION IN THE EVENT OF
BASIC CONCEPTUAL FAILURE IN LEGISLATION
One point which seems arguably to have be demonstrated by the
experience of the Acquired Rights Directive is the potential relative
inflexibility of legislation as a policy-making tool where basic conceptual
failures occur in the design of a legislative instrument (perhaps because of
the high political costs of securing agreement in the first place in such
instruments) and the potential near-irreversibility of such errors. An
example of this is arguably the entreprise organisation test adopted by the
European Court of Justice in Süzen, 105 in which the Court asserted that
105

Case C-13/95 [1997] ECR I-1259.
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“the term entity…refers to an organized grouping of persons and assets
facilitating the exercise of an economic activity which pursues a specific
objective” 106 and turned its back decisively on an entreprise-activité
approach, by expressly denying that the mere similarity of activities
carried out before and after a transfer would suffice to establish that the
transfer of an undertaking had occurred. The application of the entreprise
organisation test has given rise to ongoing difficulties. One is the difficulty
in distinguishing between asset-based undertakings and those based
essentially on personnel, 107 a distinction which has to be made in order to
apply the Süzen test (with no transfer of assets being necessary in the case
of the latter type of undertaking). Another difficulty is that the entreprise
organisation test also facilitates avoidance of the Directive in industries
which do require the use of substantial assets (via the non-transfer of those
assets). Further, the Süzen 108 test as interpreted in Oy Liikenne, 109 seems
an utterly inadequate one to protect employees who work in industries
which operate for the most part without assets: the application of the test
has led one commentator to observe that
in contracting out of services the impact of the Directive has
become, if not voluntary, at least highly contingent upon the
structuring of the commercial deal by which the contracting
out, contracting in or reassignment of the contract is effected.
Where assets are an essential part of the business, the
application of the Directive can be avoided by not transferring
the assets; where the business is ‘based essentially on

106

Para. 13 of the judgment of the Court.

107

See e.g., Case C-172/99 Oy Liikenne [2001] ECR I-745

108

Case C-13/95 [1997] ECR I-1259.

109

Case C-172/99 [2001] ECR I-745.
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manpower’, it can be avoided, it seems, by the new employer
not offering jobs to the former employer’s workforce.110
Insofar as the entreprise organisation test has been the cause of ongoing
difficulties, the Court of Justice may be criticised for the adoption of this
test and the abandonment by it of the entreprise-activité conceptualisation
of undertakings used by it in Schmidt.111 In reality, however, most of the
blame for ongoing difficulties is arguably more appropriately laid at the
door of the Community legislature. In the first place, the inflexibility with
which the entreprise organisation test is now applied stems from the fact
that the Süzen ruling was almost immediately codified by the political
institutions of the Community, which seized upon it almost immediately
as the key to resurrecting negotiations on proposed amendments to the
original Directive and securing agreement on them by the end of the 1998
British presidency of the Council. The Süzen ruling was thus quickly
incorporated into the text of the Acquired Rights Directive by a Council
which could now reassure itself that rather than broadening or narrowing
the scope of the Directive, it was merely codifying extant case-law.112 The
possibility of the Court ever reversing its approach was thus taken out of
its own hands. A second, more basic, argument can be made here,
however, to the effect that all difficulties relating to the concept of the
transfer of an undertaking are the result of an even more fundamental
conceptual error made by the Community legislature in the first place in
basing a directive aimed at the protection of employees on the notion of
the transfer of an undertaking rather than on the transfer of a workplace.
Arguably, it was this mistake as much as the adoption of the Süzen
entreprise organisation test which has caused all of the subsequent
problems in this regard. Ironically, exactly the same failure was made in
110

P. Davies, “The UK Will Have to Make Up Its Own Mind” (2001) 30 ILJ 231 at p.
234.
111

112

Case C-392/92 [1994] ECR I-1311.

See now Article 1(1)(b) of Council Directive 2001/23/EC, which repeats the wording
of Article 1(1)(b) of the original 1977 Directive as inserted by Article 1(2) of Directive
98/50/EC.
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United Kingdom and Irish law concerning the transfer of continuity for the
purposes of the respective national redundancy payments schemes, in
relation to which the Courts quickly ran into definitional difficulties
regarding the question of when a business should be regarded as having
transferred for the purposes of that legislation113—when arguably the
question of what constituted a business should never have been an issue in
the first place.
Another example of a design-flaw which has led to difficulties (in the
form of a restriction on the scope of the Directive on grounds which seem
difficult to defend in policy terms) is the large-scale exclusion of public
sector workers from the benefit of the Directive, due to the failure to adopt
a European-wide definition of employee in the manner of Community
equality law 114 or Community law on the free movement of workers. 115 It
may be that sufficient room for judicial manoeuvre has been left to the
Court of Justice to undo some of the difficulty here however.116

D. LACUNAE IN THE ACQUIRED RIGHTS DIRECTIVE AND
DELIBERATE FAILURES IN THE DIRECTIVE TO ADDRESS ISSUES
DESPITE THE INEVITABILITY OF THESE ISSUES CAUSING
DIFFICULTIES
One aspect of the Acquired Rights Directive which has been difficult to
overlook has been the number of lacunae and deliberate failures to address
113

A good example of this is seen in the decision of the House of Lords in Melon v.
Hector Powe Ltd. [1981] 1 All ER 313.
114

Case C-256/01 Allonby v. Accrington and Rossendale College [2004] ECR I-873

115

See in this regard Case C-343/98 Collino and Chiappero [2000] ECR I-6659, in
particular para. 40 of the Court’s judgment.

116

Certainly Advocate General Poaires Maduro seemed to think so in the Opinion which
he delivered in Case C-478/03 Celtec Ltd v. John Astley and Others [2005] ECR I-4389.
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issues in the directive which it could clearly be foreseen would cause
inevitable difficulties. Such omissions may well have occurred for the
understandable reason that dealing with these issues would have been
politically controversial enough with one or more member states to
jeopardise the adoption of the legislation. Nonetheless, there existence is
worthy of note, and the net effect of such omissions has been at times to
make what is excluded from the Acquired Rights Directive as interesting
as what is contained in it.
A good example of one such omission is that the Directive as originally
adopted in 1977 failed to give any indication whatsoever as to whether or
not a contracting-out, much less a change of contractors, could constitute
the transfer of an undertaking. Davies has observed that it
cannot be argued …that the issue of contracting out…arose
solely because of changes in the economic climate which
occurred after the adoption of the Directive. The Community
legislator may perhaps be forgiven for not foreseeing the extent
to which contracting out would develop in the 1980s, but that
there was here a significant legal problem was manifestly
apparent at the time the Directive was adopted.117
Similarly, the ongoing non-application of the Directive to share transfers
has left a gaping hole through which the information and consultation
requirements of the Directive have been capable of being safely avoided.
Finally, given the importance of pensions to workers, it would be difficult
to claim that the exclusion of the normal application of the Directive’s
rules by Article 3(4) of the Directive itself in relation to “employees' rights
to old-age, invalidity or survivors' benefits under supplementary company
or intercompany pension schemes outside the statutory social security

117

P. Davies, “Transfers of Undertakings” in S. Sciarra (ed.), Labour Law in the
Courts—National Judges and the European Court of Justice (Hart Publishing, Oxford,
2001) 131 at p. 136.

40

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 03 NO. 05

schemes in Member States” is anything other than a gaping hole in the
protection provided by the Directive.118
It may be noted in passing that this lack of willingness to see politically
controversial issues dealt with at European level is not always confined to
national executives represented in the Council of Ministers. A similar lack
of inclination could be witnessed in the failure of the House of Lords in
Wilson v. St. Helens Borough Council [1998] ICR 1141 to refer the
question of the precise implications of the provision of Article 4(1) of the
Directive that “the transfer of the undertaking, business or part of the
undertaking or business shall not in itself constitute grounds for dismissal
by the transferor or the transferee”.

E. LACUNAE, AMBIGUITIES AND FAILURES TO DEFINE CRUCIAL
CONCEPTS USED IN THE DIRECTIVE LEADING TO AN ENLARGED
CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE FOR THE COURT OF JUSTICE
The existence of lacunae in the Acquired Rights Directive such as those
just referred to leads on naturally to a further topic. For it is the existence
in the past of certain of these lacunae is one factor which has led to an
unusually strong law-making role being effectively delegated to the
European Court of Justice in relation to the Directive. Thus the application
of the Directive in situations of insolvency, although now a topic dealt
with in the text of the Acquired Rights Directive itself, 119 follows in very
large measure the course which had to be mapped by the Court of Justice
118

Even if qualified by the requirement under Article 3(4)(b) to adopt the measures
necessary to protect the interests of employees and of persons no longer employed in the
transferor's business at the time of the transfer in respect of rights conferring on them
immediate or prospective entitlement to old age benefits, including survivors' benefits,
under supplementary schemes.
119

See Article 5 of Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of
employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of
undertakings or businesses.
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at a time when the original Directive made no provision at all for this
important topic (a course which, once determined by the Court, was later
in large measure codified into the text of the Directive by the Community
legislature). Similarly the approach of the Directive to contracting-out
situations and to administrative reorganisations of public authorities,
important and foreseeable topics, only came to be dealt with in the text of
the Directive after the Court of Justice had been effectively forced to
create the law on these topics in the absence of any real guidance from the
legislature in the original Directive.120
A further phenomenon which is to be seen in the Acquired Rights
Directive consists of the pronounced and remarkable tendency to fail to
define concepts which is to be seen in this instrument. The Directive for
long lacked—and indeed, to some extent, still lacks—adequate definitions
of important concepts used in the application of the Directive.121 This
tendency originally extended to a concept as fundamental to the Directive
as the notion of the transfer of an undertaking, and still extends to the
issue of the consequences of a violation of the prohibition on transfergrounded dismissals, as well as the definition of “economic technical or
organisational reasons entailing changes in the workforce”—reasons
which can excuse a dismissal which would otherwise violate the Directive.
Some such imprecision seems to have been due to a degree of

120

See now Article 1(1)(b) and 1(1)(c) of the Acquired Rights Directive, following the
lead set by the Court of Justice in, respectively Case C-13/95 Süzen [1997] ECR I-1259
and Case C-298/94 Henke [1996] ECR I-4989.
121

Some such lacunae were at least in part remedied by the 1998 amendments to the 1977
Directive. At that time, ideas which had earlier been developed by the Court of Justice of
what, for example, constitutes a ‘transfer’ (see Case C-13/95 Süzen [1997] ECR I-1259)
and (insofar as one may describe this as a separable issue) of what kind of body
constitutes an ‘undertaking’ (see e.g, Case C-29/91 Dr. Sophie Redmond Stichting [1992]
ECR I-3189, Case C-382/92 Commission v. United Kingdom [1994] ECR I-2435 and
Case C-298/94 Henke [1996] ECR I-4989) were written into the text of the Directive by
the Community legislature. These amendments are now to be found in Article 1(1)(b) and
Article 1(1)(c) of the consolidating Directive 2001/23/EC. But gaps remain: it would, for
example, be difficult to describe the new definition of the transfer of an undertaking as a
comprehensive one.
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inadvertence on the part of the Community legislature.122 However, part of
it has also been attributed to the Directive’s targeting of only partial
harmonisation of Member State rules governing employment rights in
transfer situations.123
122

A good example of such inadvertence is that the Directive as originally adopted in
1977 failed to give any indication whatsoever as to whether or not a contracting-out,
much less a change of contractors, could constitute the transfer of an undertaking. Davies
has observed that it
“cannot be argued …that the issue of contracting out…arose solely because of changes in
the economic climate which occurred after the adoption of the Directive. The Community
legislator may perhaps be forgiven for not foreseeing the extent to which contracting out
would develop in the 1980s, but that there was here a significant legal problem was
manifestly apparent at the time the Directive was adopted.”
(P. Davies, loc.cit., n. 118 above). In fairness, however, in considering any charge of
inadvertence against the Community legislature, the value of deliberate vagueness in
drafting as a technique to assist the achievement of political compromise should not be
overlooked.
123

Certainly, in Case 105/84 Danmols Inventar [1985] ECR 2639, the Court of Justice
declared it clear, on the basis of an examination of a number of provisions of the original
1977 Directive, that the Directive was intended to achieve only partial harmonisation and
held that it followed that the Directive’s protection should be available only to persons
protected as employees under national law. (The original 1977 Directive said nothing on
the topic of whether the concept of ‘employee’ should be given a Community definition
or not.) A modified version of the Court’s position was later enshrined in the text of the
Directive by the Community legislature. (See now Article 2, Paragraph (2) and Subparagraph (1)(d) of Directive 2001/23/EC and see further concerning the definition of
‘employee’ text infra.) The Court has also found that where an employee declines to
avail of his or her right under the Directive to continue the employment relationship with
the transferee of the undertaking for which he or she works, it is for the Member State
concerned, rather than for Community law, ‘to determine what the fate of the contract of
employment or employment relationship should be’. (Joined Cases C-132/91, C-138/91
and C-139/91 Katsikas [1992] ECR I-6577 at para. 35 of the Court’s judgment). Since
1998, however, the discretion formerly accorded to national law as to how to deal with
contraventions of the information and consultation requirements set out in the Directive
has been limited by the general requirement that employees who consider themselves
wronged by failure to comply with obligations arising from the Directive be enabled to
pursue their claims by judicial process after possible recourse to other competent
authorities. (See now Article 9 of the 2001 Directive).
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Again, a corollary of this failure to provide necessary definitions has been
the necessary development of a broad constitutional role for the Court of
Justice in providing definitions needed in order to apply the Directive
which would otherwise be lacking. Thus, for example, as has already been
seen in the text above, the failure of the legislature to ascribe a meaning to
the concept of undertaking for the purposes of the Directive forced the
Court to do this instead (albeit that it initially vacillated over whether to
use the entreprise-activité model or the entreprise-organisation one, before
finally espousing the latter option).
The level of ambiguity in the text of the Directive has had similar
constitutional implications to the lack of definitions provided in the
instrument, in that an important role (which has little counterpart at
national level, certainly in common law countries 124) has in instances of
legislative ambiguity fallen by default to the European Court of Justice
Sometimes however, so great has been the level of difficulty created by
the Community legislature that the Court has not been unable to resolve
satisfactorily difficulties created. Thus e.g., the reference (varying in its
meaning depending on which language version of the Directive is referred
to) to transfers ‘as a result of a legal transfer or merger’ has to an
increasingly pointless extent continued to be seen by the Court to require a
context of contractual relations in order for any transfer to come within the
scope of the Directive.125 The optimal solution to this difficulty—the
unambiguous broadening by the Community legislature of the scope of the
Directive to transfers effected ‘by contract or by some other disposition or
operation of law, judicial decision or administrative measure’ was
proposed by the Commission both in its 1994 draft Directive and in its
revised 1997 proposal for a Directive amending the original Acquired
Rights Directive. With somewhat depressing predictability, however, the

124

Although it may be more familiar in other legal systems such as the German, in which
a relatively high political profile seems to be envisaged for the Bundesverfassungsgericht.
125

See for example Case C-51/00 Temco Service Industries [2002] ECR I-969.
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change did not however feature in the much-weakened version of the
Directive ultimately adopted by the Council in 1998.126
Another example of ambiguity which the Court has arguably been unable
to resolve completely satisfactorily relates to the consequences for
workers of exercising their supposedly fundamental right under the
Directive—recognised by the Court in Katsikas 127—to object to their
transfer under the Directive. In the event of any such objection, the Court
held that it was for the Member States to determine what the fate of the
contract of employment or employment relationship should be.128 One
test of the Directive’s real value to employees, however, depends on
whether it gives ‘objectors’ (who, it should be remembered may have very
good grounds for their refusal to work for the transferee) the right to
remain in the employ of the transferor, or, at the very least, to
compensation for the loss of their right to employment with the transferor.

126

See Proposal for a Council Directive on the approximation of the laws of the Member
States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of
undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses (OJ C 274, 1.10.94, p. 10) at Article 1(1)
thereof; Amended proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 77/187/EEC on
the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of
employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of
businesses (OJ C 124, 21.4.97, p. 48) at Article 1(1) thereof; and Council Directive
98/50/EC of 29 June 1998 amending Directive 77/187/EEC on the approximation of the
laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event
of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses (OJ L 201, 17.7.1998, p.
88) at Article 1(1) thereof. The relevant provision is now Article 1(1) of Directive
2001/23/EC (OJ L 82, 22.3.2001, p. 16). Note that some Member States have voluntarily
applied the Directive to a wider category of employees than required by the Directive.
See in this regard F. Valdés Dal-Ré “Transfers of Undertakings: An Experience of
Clashes and Harmonies Between Community Law and National Legal Systems in S.
Sciarra, Labour Law in the Courts: National Judges and the European Court of Justice
(Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2001) at 179.
127

128

(Joined Cases C-132/91, C-138/91 and C-139/91) [1992] ECR I-6577.

Para. 35 of the judgment of the Court. This position was refined somewhat in later
case-law of the Court on this topic, but the basic position still holds true.
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The Court in Katsikas,129 however—implicitly rejecting in this respect
the Opinion offered to it by Advocate General Van Gerven 130— simply
refused to involve itself in this area. Instead, the Court took refuge in the
idea that this was an area in which the Directive espoused only partial
harmonisation and left the matter largely in the hands of national legal
systems.
The lack of certainty as to the precise implications of the provision of
Article 4(1) of the Directive that “the transfer of the undertaking, business
or part of the undertaking or business shall not in itself constitute grounds
for dismissal by the transferor or the transferee” is another zone of
ambiguity not yet cleared up by the Court of Justice, although in this case,
the responsibility is perhaps most appropriately laid at the door of national
courts for their failure to refer the question to the Court of Justice under
Article 234 of the EC Treaty.131

F. A REQUIREMENT OF SUB-OPTIMAL INTERPRETATION?
It is saying nothing particularly novel to observe that the European Court
of Justice must pay careful attention to the question of whether national
129

Notwithstanding its reference to the fundamental right of the worker to choose his or
her employer.
130

Van Gerven AG advised finding that that Directive ‘does not prevent a Member State
from conferring on employees the right to declare that the legal effects of a transfer of an
undertaking are not to apply with regard to them, as a result of which their contracts of
employment with the transferor will be maintained, provided that it is guaranteed - by
means of an agreement between the employees and the employer or under a law,
regulation or administrative provision within the meaning of Article 7 of the directive that that right of objection is more favourable to employees, not only in principle but also
in practice.’ (Emphasis added. See Cases C-132/91, C-138/91 and C-139/91 Katsikas
[1992] ECR I-6577 at para. 22 of the Advocate General’s Opinion).
131

See in this regard the ruling of the House of Lords in Wilson v. St. Helens Borough
Council [1998] ICR 1141.
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courts will follow its lead in any ruling. Autrement dit, the Court operates
is subject to restraints in interpreting Community law. The Court’s
decisions on direct effect,132 state liability,133 the interpretive obligation,134
and arguably horizontal direct effect 135 all appear to have demonstrated a
strong degree of awareness on the part of the Court (were any such
demonstration necessary) that the continued effectiveness of Community
law depends on the cooperation of national courts. At times—as with the
persistent refusal of the Court of Justice to view Directives as being
capable of giving rise to horizontal direct effect—the Court can appear
forced to adopt doctrinally sub-optimal interpretations of the law. It may
well be that some of its jurisprudence in relation to the Acquired Rights
Directive constitutes an example of this latter phenomenon.
It is difficult to determine a single dominant reason for the Court’s change
of approach in Süzen 136 from an entreprise-activité to an entrepriseorganisation conceptualisation of an undertaking (perhaps not least
132

Note the alteration in the legal basis offered by the Court for this doctrine between its
decision in Case 41/74 Van Duyn v. Home Office [1974] ECR 1337 and that in Case
148/78 Pubblico Ministero v. Ratti [1979] ECR 1629.
133

Note the development in the basis offered by the Court for this doctrine from its
decision in Case C-6/90 Francovich and Bonifaci v. Italy [1991] ECR I-5357 to that in C46/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur/ Factortame III [1996] ECR I-1029
134

See in this regard in particular the decisions of the Court of Justice concerning the
scope of this doctrine in Case C-106/89 Marleasing SA v. La Comercial Internacionale de
Alimentacion SA [1990] ECR I-4135, Case C-334/92 Wagner Miret v. Fondo de
Garantia Salarial [1993] ECR I –6911, Case C-91/92 Faccini Dori v. Recreb [1994] ECR
I—3325 and Case C-192/94 El Corte Inglés v. Blázques Rivero [1996] ECR I-1281.

135

In which deference to the lack of likelihood of finding acceptance on the part of
member state’s courts is arguably as convincing an explanation as any for the refusal by
the European Court of Justice to acknowledge that unimplemented Directives are capable
of giving rise to horizontal direct effect (while accepting that they can give rise to socalled incidental horizontal direct effect).
136

Case C-13/95 [1997] ECR I-1259.
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because the Court has never acknowledged that any such change occurred
137
). Certainly, the Court gave no reasons grounded in employee protection
for its change. However, the Court’s re-evaluation of its approach in
Süzen and resultant change did come in the face of hostility to the
entreprise-activité approach from national governments, a lack of support
for it either from the Commission or the Advocates General in either
Schmidt or Süzen, academic criticism (far from all of which was justified),
an absence of elucidation of powerful arguments in favour of the
entreprise-activité approach, a lack of any strong Community interest in
maintaining the entreprise-activité stance and finally, and perhaps most
tellingly, a negative reaction from national courts, particularly in France,
Germany and Italy.138 In the light of all of these factors, it would probably
have been more surprising if Süzen was decided in a way other than that in
which it was. Had the case been decided otherwise, the Court would
undoubtedly have found itself in an isolated position. Nevertheless, Süzen
is undoubtedly a ruling which has reduced considerably the value of the
Acquired Rights Directive as an employment protection measure of
relevance to vulnerable workers in contracting-out situations.

137

O’Leary has noted - accurately - that the Court did not overrule its previous case-law
on what constitutes a transfer (S. O’Leary, Employment Law at the European Court of
Justice (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2002) at 266). In real terms, however the Court’s ruling
in Süzen involved a marked shift in approach. See for some suggestions as to why the
Court changed its mind, P. Davies, loc. cit. at n. 118, p. 142.

138

This reaction took different forms. In France and Italy, it involved what has been
referred to as ‘passive dialogue’—the acceptance by national courts of unconvincing
arguments that national law was in conformity with national law despite recent contrary
case-law of the Court of Justice, and a consequent refusal to refer the matter to the
European Court of Justice under what is now Article 234 of the EC Treaty. In Germany,
it consisted of what has been termed ‘active dialogue’—the reference of a second or
further case to the European Court of Justice involving the same basic issue, but
accompanied by additional arguments, and constituting in effect an invitation to the Court
to change or modify its position. (See generally Davies, loc. cit. at n. 118, pp. 137 to
139).
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IV.

IMPLEMENTING ‘COMMUNITY LEGISLATION IN
THE SOCIAL POLICY FIELD: REFLECTIONS ON THE
IRISH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACQUIRED RIGHTS
DIRECTIVE
The present examination of the traditional method of Community
legislation and of the process of social dialogue as mechanisms used to
deliver Community employment law seems likely to be well served by
venturing beyond the point of adoption of such laws at European level and
examining how such measures subsequently fare at the point of
implementation. Much of Community employment legislation adopted by
the normal legislative route as well as several Article 139 social policy
agreements have taken the form of, or been annexed to Community
Directives, with a concomitant transposition obligation being imposed on
national legal systems. How have such measures fared in practice? Some
benefit may be derived by taking—once again—the experience of the
Acquired Rights Directive as an example, and by considering how its
implementation has proceeded in one member state.
Ireland now implements the Acquired Rights Directive (in its latest
embodiment139) by means of the European Communities (Protection of
Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations, 2003.140 A study of
the implementation of the Directive in Ireland was recently carried out by
the writer as part of a recent international study for the European
Commission, The Implementation and Application of EU Labour Law
139

The latest embodiment of which, as seen above, is _Directive 2001/23/EC on the
approximation of laws of the member states relating to the safeguarding of employees’
rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses.

140

Regulation 15 of these Regulations revokes both the original implementing
Regulations, the European Communities (Safeguarding of Employees' Rights on Transfer
of Undertakings) Regulations 1980 (S.I. No. 306 of 1980) (which had implemented the
original Acquired Rights Directive, Directive 77/187/EEC) and the later European
Communities (Safeguarding of Employees' Rights on Transfer of Undertakings)
(Amendment) Regulations 2000 (S.I. No. 487 of 2000) which had substantially amended
the 1980 Regulations.
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Directives in the Enlarged European Union. Arising from that study, the
following observations are offered in relation to the experience of
implementation of the Acquired Rights Directive in Ireland as an example
of the achievement of a policy in the social field via the use of a directive.
How transferable to other Member States or to other policy contexts any
lessons learned are is of course an open question, although it seems
probable that at least some of them are.141

A. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MEANS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
DIRECTIVE CHOSEN BY THE MEMBER STATE
The effectiveness with which a European Community policy in the
employment field which is sought to be implemented through the
enactment of a directive is carried into effect seems likely—judging by
Ireland’s experience with the Acquired Rights Directive—to be strongly
affected by the means chosen by the member state to implement the
directive. In Ireland, the choice of transposition means has traditionally
comes down to one between the adoption of an Act of the Oireachtas, and
the simpler, more expedient and yet less transparent and more
democratically troublesome recourse to the adoption of Ministerial
Regulations. The legal obligation to transpose large numbers of directives
and give effect to various items of Community legislation has the result
that in practice large numbers of statutory instruments are adopted each
year in fulfilment of Ireland’s obligations under Community law—a
situation which has been prevented from giving rise to constitutional
difficulties only by virtue of a liberal interpretation by the Irish Supreme
Court of when such recourse to Ministerial regulations is to be viewed as
permissible in the context of the implementation of the requirements of
European Community law.142 Historically, the less rigorous drafting
141

The publication of the study, which was carried out under the leadership of Middlesex
University Business School, is likely to provide some information in this regard.
142

See in this regard e.g., Meagher v Minister for Agriculture and Food and others [1994]
I.R. 329 and Maher, Brett and Ryan v. Minister for Agriculture [2001] ILRM 481.

50

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 03 NO. 05

standards applied to the adoption of secondary legislation have resulted in
various provisions of the Acquired Rights Directive being implemented
through regulations which frequently repeat verbatim or almost verbatim
the provisions of the Directive being implemented, however inappropriate
this may have been.143 The results of the less demanding requirements of
proceeding in this way appear to have been:
(a) a failure to integrate properly the legislation implementing the
Directive into the body of Irish employment law. One example of
this is the provision of Regulation 5 (3) of the 2003 Regulations
that “if a contract of employment is terminated because the transfer
involves a substantial change in working conditions to the
detriment of the employee concerned, the employer concerned
shall be regarded as having been responsible for the termination of
the contract of employment.” This is close to144 a verbatim
reproduction of provision of Article 4(2) of the 2001 Directive.
What it fails to make, however, is any effort to explain the key
issue of whether the test to be applied in relation to the substantial
change is to be a contract-based one or not.
(b) the importation of uncertainty directly from the Directive into Irish
implementing legislation. Thus, Regulation 3(1) of the 2003
Regulations provides that the Regulations shall apply to any
transfer of an undertaking, business, or part of an undertaking or
business from one employer to another employer as a result of a
legal transfer (including the assignment or forfeiture of a lease) or
merger. Such a definition—largely identical to that found in
Article 1 of the 2001 Directive—has had the advantage of helping
to ensure that Irish legislation does not fall foul of the evolving
standards required by the Directive. What it has not done is to
provide sufficient guidance to employers or workers. Similarly, the
stipulation in Article 4(1) of Directive 2001/23/EC that “the
143

The original implementing regulations (now happily repealed) were a particularly
egregious example of this. See the European Communities (Safeguarding of Employees'
Rights on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 1980 (S.I. No. 306 of 1980).
144

The words ‘employment relationship’ found in the Directive are not repeated.
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transfer of the undertaking, business or part of the undertaking or
business shall not in itself constitute grounds for dismissal by the
transferor or the transferee” has been implemented in Irish law by
the provision of Regulation 5(1) of the 2003 Regulations that “the
transfer of an undertaking, business or part of an undertaking or
business shall not in itself constitute grounds for dismissal by the
transferor or the transferee and such a dismissal, the grounds for
which are such a transfer, by a transferor or a transferee is
prohibited.” This is probably the least well-drafted implementation
of a provision of the 2001 Directive in Irish law. Thus the
statement that a dismissal is prohibited seems to convey the
impression that such a dismissal is void and yet in practice this
does not seem to be how the measure is generally viewed as
applying.145
(c) the use of terminology (e.g., [the transfer of an undertaking] “as a
result of a legal transfer”146, “dismissals for economic, technical or
organisational reasons which entail changes in the workforce” 147 )
unfamiliar to Irish lawyers and either poorly defined or not defined
at all. In fairness, some improvement has taken place over time
with the elimination of the formerly confusing reference in the
Irish implementing Regulations to an ‘employment relationship’
(as distinct from a contract of employment) and with the
clarifications in the meaning to be attributed to “representatives of
employees” for the purposes of the Regulations.148

145

See the brief discussion in the text below of the High Court ruling in Mythen v.
Employment Appeals Tribunal, Butterkrust and Joseph Downes and Sons Ltd (in
receivership) [1990] IR 98.
146

Found in Regulation 3(1) of the 2003 Regulations.

147

Regulation 5(2) of the 2003 Regulations.

148

See now Regulation 2(1) of the 2003 Regulations, and note also the provisions of
Regulations 7(2) and 8(5) thereof.
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How inevitable all or any of these problems are depends on the standards
applied in relation to the drafting of secondary legislation but it is difficult
to believe that the necessarily punctilious approach to the drafting of
legislation promoted by the prospect of scrutiny (the rigorousness of
which is incentivised by the prospect of political gains for those involved)
in the passage of primary legislation through a bicameral legislature is
likely to be easily replicable in any less rigorous process of drafting of
secondary legislation.

B. THE POTENTIAL FOR DISRUPTION OF THE HARMONY OF A
NATIONAL POLICY APPROACH IN RELATION TO A PARTICULAR
ISSUE BY THE ENACTMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A
DIRECTIVE
A second phenomenon observable in the implementation of the Acquired
Rights Directive is the potential for disruption of the harmony of a
national policy approach in relation to a particular issue through the
implementation of a directive.
Perhaps the best example of this relates to the meaning attributed to the
concept of “representatives of employees” for the purposes of the
Regulations.149 Irish trade union law has for long focused on the policy
goal of reducing the large number of unions in existence in this state. In
pursuance of this policy, it has for long rendered illegal the conduct of
collective bargaining with entities representing employees which do not
constitute trade unions,150 staff associations or excepted bodies.151 Under
149

See now Regulation 2(1) of the 2003 Regulations, and note also the provisions of
Regulations 7(2) and 8(5) thereof.
150

Note that Regulation 2(1) defines "trade union" as meaning a trade union which holds
a negotiating licence under the Trade Union Act 1941—a highly restrictive definition.
151

See more generally in relation to this policy chapter 2 of T. Kerr and G. Whyte, Irish
Trade Union Law (1985, Professional Books, Dublin). See the definitions of “trade
union” and “excepted body” now provided in Regulation 2(1) of the 2003 Regulations.
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the original Irish regulations which implemented the original form of the
Acquired Rights Directive, the European Communities (Safeguarding of
Employees' Rights on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations, 1980 152—
no definition at all was provided of the concept of representatives of
employees, even though this concept was used in those Regulations. This
implicitly had the effect of confining the concept to trade unions, staff
associations or excepted bodies. Subsequently, however, the decision of
the European Court of Justice in Commission v. United Kingdom 153
made clear that such a restrictive approach to the meaning of employee
representatives was not consonant with the requirements of the Directive.
Subsequent to the receipt of a reasoned opinion from the Commission
which pointed out the difficulties with the then definition, the concept was
expanded, in Regulation 4 of the European Communities (Safeguarding of
Employees' Rights on Transfer of Undertakings) (Amendment)
Regulations, 2000, to include “in the absence of such a trade union, staff
association or excepted body, a person or persons chosen (under an
arrangement put in place by the employer) by such employees from
among their number to represent them in negotiations with the
employer”.154 The 2003 Regulations maintained this arrangement with a
marginal increase in specificity,155 and through the stipulation in
Regulation 8(5) that where there are no employees' representatives in the
Note that Regulation 2(1) of the 2003 Regulations defines "excepted body" as having the
meaning assigned to it by section 6(3) of the Trade Union Act 1941.
152

Statutory Instrument No. 306 of 1980 (implementing Directive 77/187/EEC).

153

Case C-382/92 [1994] ECR I-2435.

154

It will be noted that this put the onus on the employer to put arrangements in place.

155

Viz., by stating in Regulation 7(2) that where a transferred undertaking does not
preserve its autonomy, it is the transferee who is bound by the obligation to make the
referred-to arrangement, and by defining the group with the right to choose who should
represent them as “employees transferred who were represented before the transfer”. The
increased specificity seems to stem from the word-for-word implementation of the
Directive, however, rather than any conscious decision to change legal policy: Regulation
7(2) simply mirrors the corresponding provision of Article 6(1) of Directive 2001/23/EC.
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undertaking or business of the transferor/transferee, a procedure is to be
put in place by the transferor or the transferee whereby the employees may
choose from among their number a person or persons to represent them
(including by means of an election) for the purposes of the Regulations.156
It should be noted that the effect of the expansion beyond its original
meaning of the concept of employee’s representatives has the effect that
the 2003 Regulations effectively carve out an exception to a rule which is
laid down by an Act of the Oireachtas (the parliament). The result of this
is that—to an increasing extent, given the expansion of European
legislation relating to employee consultation and information rights—that
European law has become something of a cuckoo in the nest in relation to
Irish trade union policy. Ireland, as a result of interventions including, but
not confined to the Acquired Rights Directive, is simultaneously pursuing
two inconsistent policies at the one time, one of them, domestic in origin,
seeking to reduce the number of organisations or bodies engaging in
discussions with employers on behalf of workers, the other actively
promoting the setting up of such bodies.
This may of course be argued to be the inevitable price (and, depending on
the context, a fair price, at that) of integration through law 157—any law,
156

Regulation 8(6) makes a form of fall-back provision by stipulating that where,
notwithstanding paragraph (5), there are still no representatives of the employees in an
undertaking or business concerned (through no fault of the employees), each of the
employees concerned must be given certain information in writing, where reasonably
practicable, not later than 30 days before the transfer and, in any event, in good time
before the transfer.
157

There may be others. Such a centralised approach means that - together with any
benefits associated a particular approach to any legal issue in addition to the benefits of
centralisation itself - problems at the centre transmit themselves to the member states, a
prime example in relation to the Acquired Rights Directive being the difficulties
encountered by the European Court of Justice in determining the application or otherwise
of the Directive in contracting-out situations, the law in relation to which was specifically
pointed out to this writer by employer representatives interviewed as giving rise to
considerable difficulties in practice. See for an article stressing such problems, T.
Hartley, “The European Union and the Systematic Dismantling of the Common Law of
Conflict of Laws” (2005) 54 ICLQ 813.
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not just a directive, in any policy area, where that integration does not
involve the complete the replacement of an entire body of domestic law in
the relevant policy field. It is a phenomenon seen in other areas of law
outside the social policy field (for instance, tort law, in which European
law has intervened in the consumer protection area, or criminal procedure
law in which the impact of the Third Pillar is now making itself
increasingly felt). It is for all that a phenomenon which very visibly occurs
in the context of the implementation of the Acquired Rights Directive and
seems worthy of note here.

C. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CONTEXT PROVIDED BY THE
SYSTEM OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS OF THE MEMBER STATE IN
QUESTION
Reference has been made above to the potential for disruption through the
implementation of a directive of the harmony of national policy approach
in relation to a particular issue. In the early days of the Acquired Rights
Directive it might have seemed more realistic to allude to the experience
of this Directive (at least in the United Kingdom and Ireland) as providing
much stronger evidence of the potential for disruption of a European-wide
approach by virtue of national implementation strategies than it provided
for the potential for disruption of national policy choices in relation to
particular issues. This was due to the well-known difficulties created by
the narrowness of the United Kingdom definition (and implicitly the Irish
definition also) of ‘employee representatives’. It took some time for the
ruling of the European Court of Justice in Commission v. United
Kingdom158 to reveal that the definition of employee representative chosen
by the United Kingdom was unacceptably narrow for the purposes of the
Directive. However, with this ruling, at least one source of evidence of the

158

Case C-382/92 [1994] ECR I-2435

56

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 03 NO. 05

disruptive potential for a European approach risked in the choice of a
Directive as an implementing method has disappeared.159
However, other evidence is provided by the experience of the Acquired
Rights Directive of the susceptibility to national contexts of a Europeanwide approach to a social policy issue pursued through the means of the
enactment and transposition of a directive. Thus the context provided by
the system of industrial relations of a member state in question can vitally
affect the impact of a directive.
The experience of the implementation of the Acquired Rights Directive
regarding collective agreements reflects this. Regulation 4(2) of the 2003
Regulations (repeating verbatim what is stated in the first indent of Article
3(3) of the Directive) provides that “following a transfer, the transferee
shall continue to observe the terms and conditions agreed in any collective
agreement on the same terms applicable to the transferor under that
agreement until the date of termination or expiry of the collective
agreement or the entry into force or application of another collective
agreement.” The 2003 Regulations thus preserve the pre-transfer situation
as regards transfers of collective agreements.

159

Or at least has been reduced to the risk of illegal behaviour on the part of a member
state.
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Because of the voluntarist nature of Irish industrial relations,160 however,
in general, collective agreements are not legally binding. Thus the
significance of Regulation 4(2) has been limited: the transferee’s
continuing to observe the terms and conditions agreed in any collective
agreement on the same terms applicable to the transferor under that
agreement imposes no greater legal constraints on the transferee than it
does on the transferor—which is to say, in the normal event, none at all.
The binding power of the collective agreement will in general depend on
the extent of the collective bargaining power possessed by the workforce.
This remains the case after as before the transfer.161
The provision of the second indent of Article 3(3) of the Directive that
Member States “may limit the period for observing such terms and
conditions with the proviso that it shall not be less than one year” has not
been taken up by the Irish 2003 Regulations: given the lack of binding
force of collective agreements, taking advantage of this derogation was
unnecessary for Ireland. It would have been possible to give legally
binding force to collective agreements in the event of a transfer of an
undertaking, but this in most cases would have involved a considerable

160

See generally chapter 6 of T. Kerr and G. Whyte, op. cit., at n. 52. For a more
introductory view, see Chapter 7 of F. Meenan, Working Within the Law (second edition,
1999, Oak Tree Press, Dublin). Kerr and Whyte, ibid., examine the exceptions to the
general rule. It should additionally be noted that the general voluntarist nature of Irish
industrial relations has been subject to some new statutory incursion in recent times. See
now the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act, 2001 and the powers of intervention
which it gives to the Labour Court where, for example, it is not the practice of an
employer to engage in collective bargaining negotiations and the internal dispute
resolution procedures (if any) normally used by the parties concerned have failed to
resolve the dispute; or, for example, the employer has failed to observe a provision of the
Code of Practice on Voluntary Dispute Resolution. It should be noted that under s. 10 of
the 2001 Act, the possibility exists of giving legally-binding force to determinations of
the Tribunal by way of an order of the Circuit Court.

161

It is possible, although not inevitable, that the underlying balance of power in the
workplace may be disturbed by the fact of, for example, a transfer of part of an
undertaking—and the balance of collective bargaining influence may tilt in favour of or
against the workforce. This is not something which either the Directive or the
Regulations attempt to address, however.
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enhancement of the legal rights of workers far above what they enjoyed in
the pre-transfer situation.
There appears to be little evidence that Regulation 4(2) of the 2003
Regulations is making any difference in practice. A representative of the
Irish Congress of Trade Unions interviewed by this writer was adamant
that if there is a trade union presence in the workplace in the first place, it
is this presence and not the existence of Regulation 4(2) which will ensure
the survival of collectively agreed arrangements. He was unable to recall
one case in which a union had been de-recognised subsequent to a
transfer. It is perhaps for this reason that the non-insertion of the one year
time limit has occasioned no controversy: the lack of a time limit is
scarcely felt because Regulation 4(2) itself has had no real impact. An
Irish Business and Employers’ Confederation interviewee agreed that
unionisation of the transferor made a huge difference as regards awareness
of rights under the Regulations and their ability to apply pressure to
protect their members’ interests.
Apart from the situation regarding collective agreements, further evidence
of the importance of the context of industrial relations of a particular
member state as regards the implementation of provisions of social policyrelated directives is arguably given by the relatively poor results which
have been attained by the information and consultation
The trade union view expressed in interview to this writer was that
employers in Ireland frequently tend to adopt a casual approach to the
information and consultation requirements under the Regulations.
Interviews with employer representatives conducted by the writer tended
to bear this out, with the feeling that this phenomenon is particularly the
case where small employers are concerned, where the employer often
knows his workforce personally, has a somewhat entrenched manner of
dealing with it and may well feel a formalised information and
consultation process to be superfluous and e.g., information conveyed by
letter to suffice. A typical example of where this might happen might be
when the original owner of the business is retiring or selling the business.
A trade union interviewee also pointed out that there is also a serious
question as to whether worker will bother to enforce the Regulations in a
given situation, given the relatively small awards of compensation

2007]

DELIVERING A COMMUNITY EMPLOYMENT LAW

59

available to each individual, with this tendency being particularly
pronounced in non-unionised employment.
The trade union view as expressed to this writer is that any information
workers obtained under the Regulations may be useful but the information
legally required by the Regulations is insufficient to render the assistance
required to obtain what the trade unions see as sufficient participation
rights in decision-making. The trade unions attitude seems to be that
consultations should be required about whether the transfer should take
place at all, whether it is right for the enterprise, the owners and the
employees and whether the decision to transfer should be changed or
reversed. Further, trade unions feel that information and consultation
should be with a view to reaching an agreement. (Such an extensive
participation rights are not required by the Directive, at present, however.)
Further, the trade union view was that employers do not take the
consultation process, where this applies, as seriously as they ought to, with
the general approach of employers being one of making their minds up as
to what they intend to do before ever consulting with employees, with any
consultation tending to be very focused on the basis of how the transfer
can be facilitated. Thus the decision regarding the transfer is felt to be
regarded by employers as essentially one to be taken on a unilateral basis
with employees being informed and consulted only after the basic decision
has been made. Interviewed trade unionists argued that participation rights
should not act in this way as a mere regulatory burden to be borne on the
way to the goal of effecting a transfer, but rather as a process which can
put the transfer itself in question, a view which, however, is not reflected
in the terms of the Directive.
Although of course the extent of consultation varies, the trade union view
was that what normally happens is employers normally take a very
minimalist approach, addressing only what they are prepared to address.
Remedies are for breach of the obligations imposed by the Regulations are
seen by trade unions as inadequate.162 One trade union interviewee
expressed the view that the attitude adopted by Irish employers was
162

A question discussed further in the text below.
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different to that in countries such as Germany and France where there is a
context of co-determination, and that with the voluntarist system industrial
relations system which applies in this jurisdiction, that it was more a case
of getting from employers only what they could be compelled to give.
This was described to the writer as a cultural factor, born out of the
industrial relations system.

D. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CONTEXT PROVIDED BY THE
DEGREE OF COLLECTIVE ORGANISATION OF THE INDUSTRY OR
WORKPLACE IN QUESTION
If the Irish experience of the Acquired Rights Directive shows that the
system of industrial relations of a member state in question can vitally
affect the impact of a directive, it also shows that the degree of collective
organisation of the industry or workplace in question can also be a major
factor in the implementation of a directive in the employment law field.
The context of the particular industry and in particular whether it is
unionised or not seems to count for much—both in determining the extent
to which rights supposedly granted by the Directive will be vindicated (for
without unionisation, workers are unlikely to find out about the rights
which they supposedly enjoy) and in determining the extent to which such
rights will be enhanced.
An example of this is to be found in outsourcing (also referred to as
‘contracting out’ or ‘vertical disintegration’) situations.The trade union
view as expressed to this writer in interview was that there was some
evidence that in certain labour intensive industries, workers are not being
retained in outsourcing situations, but rather are being let go by their
employer any time a contract is not renewed. This was confirmed (at least
in relation to the extent that such behaviour is not illegal) by the
observation by an employer organisation interviewee that in contractcleaning and other contract service industries, a lot of employers would be
very aware of the case-law and would be aware that avoiding the transfer
of staff would avoid the application of the Regulations and would act
accordingly. On the other hand, the point was made by a trade union
interviewee that a lot of the larger cleaning companies are unionised,

2007]

DELIVERING A COMMUNITY EMPLOYMENT LAW

61

which improves the level of protection of workers’ rights (awareness of
rights etc) in such undertakings, although independently of the application
of the Regulations. IBEC confirmed that where workers on a contract are
unionised (as many are, particularly in the cleaning sector, where many
workers are members of SIPTU, the largest union in the Republic),
incoming contractors have on numerous occasions been compelled to take
on the existing staff particularly by pressure being put on the party to
whom the service is being provided (such as threats to picket etc.)
particularly where this party is in the (highly unionised) public sector.
Unions may also succeed in having the particular needs of employees met.
Many in the cleaning industry would be on the minimum wage, and
working only part-time and might not want to work on another contract in
a location which would involve them incurring travelling expenses etc. A
trade union interviewee argued that unionisation can actually help
employers to retain contracts as the union can act as a channel of
communication between the employer and employees if competitive
pressures render matters difficult for the enterprise, and facilitate
workplace adjustments necessary to keep the contract.
Ironically, among the legal rights conferred by the Directive which are
most affected in practice by the context of unionisation or lack thereof is
the right to the representatives of the employees affected by a transfer to
the preservation of their status and function. Regulation 7 of the 2003
Regulations—following fairly closely the wording of the relevant
provision of the Acquired Rights Directive itself 163— provides that
where an undertaking, business or part of an undertaking or
business the subject of a transfer, preserves its autonomy after
the transfer, the status and function of the representatives or of
the representation of the employees affected by the transfer
163

Article 6(1) of the Directive states that “if the undertaking, business or part of an
undertaking or business preserves its autonomy, the status and function of the
representatives or of the representation of the employees affected by the transfer shall be
preserved on the same terms and subject to the same conditions as existed before the date
of the transfer by virtue of law, regulation, administrative provision or agreement,
provided that the conditions necessary for the constitution of the employee's
representation are fulfilled.”
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shall be preserved by the transferee concerned on the same
terms and subject to the same conditions as existed before the
date of the transfer as specified in any enactment, or in any
agreement between the employer and the employees'
representatives.
Irish trade unions see this provision of the Regulations as having made
little if any difference in practice. An Irish Congress of Trade Unions
interviewee could think of no case where collective bargaining
arrangements had been set aside by the new employer. However, he felt
that this had nothing to do with the regulations, but rather with industrial
relations realities.164 It may be that the Regulations have some
independent or reinforcing effect, however: an IBEC interviewee reported
that non-unionised employers were being advised by IBEC that they are
legally obliged to accept collective bargaining rights if these existed in a
transferred undertaking.
As regards the consultation and information requirements imposed under
the Directive, the trade union view as expressed to this writer in interview
was that the fact of union representation in a transfer situation makes a
very considerable difference, with, in this situation, the requirements of
the 2003 Regulations acting as a bottom line—the very minimum that
unions will expect an employer to do. The view was expressed that where
there is collective representation employers will do more than is required
by the 2003 Regulations because they will want to effect the transfer with
the least possible trouble for themselves.

164

The same interviewee pointed out (correctly) that the Regulations have no role in
extending collective bargaining rights in the transferred unit where they have not
previously existed. Interestingly, an IBEC interviewee confirmed that where workers on a
contract are unionised (as many are, particularly in the cleaning sector, where many
workers are members of SIPTU, the largest union in the Republic), the incoming
contractor will frequently be compelled to comply with the Regulations and take on the
existing staff particularly by pressure being put on the party to whom the service is being
provided (such as threats to picket etc.) particularly where this party is in the (highly
unionised) public sector.
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E. THE CRUCIAL NATURE OF SANCTIONS AND ENFORCEMENT
MECHANISMS, WHERE A CHOICE IS MADE TO IMPLEMENT A
PARTICULAR SOCIAL POLICY BY WAY OF COMMUNITY
DIRECTIVE
The experience of the Acquired Rights Directive in Ireland testifies
eloquently to the importance of the question of sanctions and enforcement
mechanisms, where a choice is made to implement a particular social
policy by way of the adoption and then transposition at national level of a
Directive.
As regards sanctions, a good example of the difficulties which can be
given rise to by inadequate provision concerning sanctions relates to the
dismissal prohibition in the Regulations, which has already been adverted
to in the text above. Under Regulation 5(1) of the 2003 Regulations “the
transfer of an undertaking, business or part of an undertaking or business
shall not in itself constitute grounds for dismissal by the transferor or the
transferee and such a dismissal, the grounds for which are such a transfer,
by a transferor or a transferee is prohibited.” As noted above, this
provision is unfortunately worded in that it seems to convey the
impression that such a dismissal is void. Indeed in the cases of Brett and
others v. Niall Collins Ltd.(in receivership) and Oyster Investments Ltd
trading as Fotoking 165 and again in Harte v. Gendrum Enterprises Ltd.166,
the Irish Employment Appeals Tribunal took the view that a dismissal
contrary to the provisions of the 1980 Regulations (the wording of which
has not been altered in the equivalent provision of the 2003 Regulations)
was prohibited by the Regulations and a nullity. Although these decisions
do not reflect the general approach followed either by the EAT or by the
Irish courts since, or (for some time) before (with the normal practice
having subsequently been to regard such dismissals as effective
dismissals, albeit contrary to the Unfair Dismissals Acts), they are
illustrative of the difficulties which can be created by inadequate provision
165

[1995] ELR 69

166

RP 351/2001
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for sanctions in national legislation implementing Community
employment law. Indeed, an even better illustration is the fact that for
several years, under the original Irish implementing legislation 167—which
did not contain the provisions found in the 2003 Regulations regarding the
role of rights commissioners—the dismissal provision, which is a crucial
provision both in the structure of the Regulations and in the attainment of
the goals of the Directive, was largely moribund in Irish law. Matters
changed only when the Irish High Court expressed the view in Mythen v.
Employment Appeals Tribunal, Butterkrust and Joseph Downes and Sons
Ltd (in receivership) 168 that dismissal in breach of the Irish implementing
Regulations was to be regarded as a violation of unfair dismissals
legislation and that therefore the application of the relevant Regulations
came within the jurisdiction of the Employment Appeals Tribunal.169
Another example of difficulties capable of being occasioned by the
inadequate provision of sanctions concerns the information and
consultation provisions of the Directive and implementing Regulations.
The view was expressed by trade union representatives that in many the
remedies for breach of the information and consultation provisions are
viewed as insufficiently large to create a disincentive. Employers are
frequently not greatly concerned about being caught and fined lightly. The
existence of this attitude on the part of some employers (particularly small
employers) was confirmed in other interviews conducted by the writer.
Breaches of the information and consultation provisions do however
attract a potential award of compensation of up to four weeks

167

The European Communities (Safeguarding of Employees' Rights on Transfer of
Undertakings) Regulations 1980 (S.I. No. 306 of 1980).

168

169

[1990] IR 98.

Even now, some residual uncertainty remains as to the precise legal status of a
dismissal contrary to the Regulations, although most of this uncertainty originates in
European Community law, since there has been considerable ambiguity in the rulings of
the Court of Justice on this point. See in this regard, e.g., the rulings of the Court in Case
101/87 P. Bork International [1988] ECR 3057 at para. 18 thereof, and more recently,
Case C-51/00 Temco Service Industries [2002] ECR I-969 at para. 28 thereof.
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remuneration,170 and the view of the Department of Enterprise, Trade and
Employment officials interviewed by this writer was that given that such
an award could be made in favour of each affected employee, this was a
substantial remedy and that going much beyond it could pose risks of
putting transferor or transferee enterprises out of business. The level of
remedies follows the precedent of earlier Irish employment legislation.
The remedies issue does not merely affect the attitude of employers. Trade
union interviewees noted that that it is often in question as to whether a
given worker will go to the trouble of attempting to enforce the
Regulations insofar as these concern anything other than dismissal, given
the relatively small awards of compensation available. In practice, it
would seem that trade union representation makes a very great difference
in terms of securing compliance with the legislation, but if employment is
unionised, reliance on sanctions is less necessary to secure compliance
with the Regulations.
As regards the enforcement mechanism provided by Irish law in order to
assure compliance by transferors and transferees in relation to the
Acquired Rights Directive, difficult and almost inevitably unsatisfactory
choices have had to be made. To some extent the government appear
caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place. Reliance on the
Employment Appeals Tribunal has tended to meet condemnation from
trade unionists on the basis of an allegedly over legalistic approach. The
alternative—and what in the future will be the ascendant 171—approach of
reliance on rights commissioners, however, although more acceptable to
trade unionists, seems deeply problematic in terms of securing adequate
170

Regulation 10(5) of the 2003 Regulations

171

See in this regard now the most recent national social partnership agreement, Towards
2016 - Ten-Year Framework Social Partnership Agreement 2006-2015 (2006,
Department of the Taoiseach, Dublin)
(available
online
at
http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/attached_files/Pdf%20files/Towards2016PartnershipAgreem
ent.pdf) at parag. 15.11 thereof).
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enforcement of the aims of the Directive, something which has attracted
the criticism of representatives of IBEC interviewed by this writer.
Under Article 9 of the Directive, Member States are required to introduce
into their national legal systems such measures as are necessary to enable
all employees and representatives of employees who consider themselves
wronged by failure to comply with the obligations arising from the
Directive to pursue their claims by judicial process after possible recourse
to other competent authorities. Regulation 10(1) of the 2003 Regulations
accordingly provides that a complaint that an employer has contravened
any of the 2003 Regulations 172 in relation to an employee may be
presented to a rights commissioner either by the employee, or by a trade
union, staff association or excepted body on behalf and with the consent of
the employee. A decision of a rights commissioner under paragraph (4)
must do one or more of the following: declare that the complaint is well
founded or not; require the employer to comply with the Regulations and,
for that purpose, to take a specified course of action; or require the
employee to pay such compensation as the Rights Commissioner thinks
just and equitable in the circumstances.173 A party concerned may appeal
(normally only within a six week period 174) to the EAT (attendance
before which can be compelled 175) from a decision of a rights
commissioner under Regulation 10.176
172

With the exceptions of other than Regulations 4(4)(a) and 13.

173

In the case of a contravention of Regulation 8, this may not exceed 4 weeks
remuneration and, in the case of a contravention of any other Regulation, it may not
exceed 2 years remuneration. See generally regarding all the foregoing Regulation 10(5)
and (6).
174

Regulation 11(2).

175

Regulation 13(3). This is in contrast to the position regarding rights commissioners.

176

Regulation 11(1) of the 2003 Regulations. The Tribunal may affirm, vary or set aside
the decision of the rights commissioner. Under Regulation 12(1), a question of law may
be referred to the High Court by the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment from
the EAT proceedings. Note that
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The trade union view of rights commissioners is much more approving
than their view of the Employment Appeals Tribunal, and the fact that
unlike the EAT, Rights Commissioners will act as mediators, facilitating
the settlement of cases (for instance by the payment of sums by way of
compensation) appears to meet with their approval. An ICTU interviewee
argued the need for institutions for the vindication of employment rights
generally to be more “user-friendly, more concerned with people than with
process”.177
The trade union view was that “the EAT is a very cold place for
employees to vindicate their rights” by its very nature and because its rules
of procedure, involving formal procedures such as the taking of evidence
on oath, the possibility of cross-examination by a senior counsel of a
worker (who may be a migrant worker with a poor grasp of English and
who—in particular if he or she does not come from unionised
employment—may be unrepresented) make it so. It was argued that
Tribunal has evolved in effect into a court, something it was not meant to
be from the outset (as one can see from its lack of power to award costs),
and that the fact that its chairpersons were solicitors and barristers had
helped to make this the case. This combined with what trade unions see as
the relatively low amount of compensation available to each worker even
if they succeed with a claim is viewed by the trade unions as a strong
the Circuit Court can be involved at enforcement level, too.
177

This corresponds with the Rights Commissioners own view of themselves. According
to the Labour Relations Commission Annual Report 2004 (P.R.N. A5/0741, June, 2005)
at p. 26 and 28 thereof

“the nature of referrals has gradually changed the role of the Rights Commissioner from a
function solely within the industrial disputes arena to a combination of that role with that
of a quasi-judicial role in respect of employment rights. Rights Commissioners now deal
with pay, holidays, working conditions, contracts and pensions in an enhanced role
beyond that as originally envisaged in the establishing legislation. As part of their role in
deciding on claims and complaints, the Rights Commissioners also have, by statute, the
authority to mediate in matters before them.”
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disincentive to bringing a claim,178 as is the fact that even if they succeed
they will have to pay a large proportion of what they have been awarded to
an advocate, if they have chosen to be represented. Unsurprisingly, a
Report of the ICTU’s Employment Rights Group has recommended
compulsory first instance recourse to Rights Commissioners.
If there is a positive side to the use of Rights Commissioners, however,
there is also a negative one. Hearings before Rights Commissioners are
held in private, and there is a serious lack of transparency regarding the
grounds on which Rights Commissioners reach their decisions. Adequate
records of these grounds are not being kept or at least are not being made
available in the public register of decisions, making it impossible to tell
why remedies were awarded or refused or why the remedy awarded in one
case is greater than the remedy awarded in the next.179 A thorough perusal
of such records as are contained in the Register did not make it clear that a
proper understanding of the regulations is held by all Rights
Commissioners. No case-law whatsoever of any sort, either Irish or
European has ever been cited in any decision since records began with the
coming into force of the 2000 Regulations and there is no evidence from
these records that Rights Commissioners are even aware of such case-law.
Furthermore, Rights Commissioners are appointed on the nomination of
the social partners—with, somewhat remarkably, no legal knowledge or
qualification being required of them in order for appointment as a Rights
Commissioner, even though, according to the Labour Relations
Commission Annual Report 2004 180 upwards of 75% of what they now
have to do—including their application of the 2003 Regulations—involves
the application of legal rights and obligations. As the quotation from the
Annual Report of the Labour Relations Commission in the text above
178

It was pointed out that the legal maximum of two years earnings is rarely awarded.

179

It should be noted that permission to photocopy any of the contents of the register of
decisions which is required under the Regulations is invariably refused (and was refused
even to this writer, although permission was granted to visually inspect the public register
itself).
180

Labour Relations Commission Annual Report 2004 (P.R.N. A5/0741, June, 2005) at
p. 26 and 28 thereof.
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makes clear, notwithstanding the fact that the role of Rights
Commissioners is coming to be increasingly dominated by the need to
apply legislation, their role originated as an industrial relations one and it
appeared to this writer that these origins continue to colour their approach
to the application of the law, and not always in a positive manner.
Anecdotal evidence provided in interviews to this writer suggests that the
goal of the successful mediation of a settlement between the parties is at
least on occasion given primary importance, over and above the correct
application of the terms of the Regulations. However, it should be
emphasised that in the absence of anything approaching an adequate level
of transparency, it is difficult to form any certain conclusions. Although it
should be stressed that the Irish Congress of Trade Unions is happy with
the service provided by Rights Commissioners, most particularly on the
basis of the relative lack of formality of its procedures, the lack of
transparency associated with the process makes it impossible to verify that
the remedy provided by the Rights Commissioners service provides an
effective vindication of the rights granted under the Directive.
IBEC’s view as expressed to this writer in interview is that some kind of
authoritative forum interpreting the legislation is needed. It is felt that the
whole transfer of undertakings area is sufficiently complex that cases
involving these issues should not be brought before Rights
Commissioners, but rather that the first instance should be the
Employment Appeals Tribunal and then appeals be brought to the Circuit
Court where a solid body of guiding case-law could build up in contrast
with what IBEC feels are the inconsistent decisions of the EAT.181
Familiarity with European case-law (e.g., whether it was settled or not) on
the part of the adjudicating body is felt to be necessary on the part of
IBEC and this is one of the reasons they are generally dissatisfied with the
extent of the jurisdiction which has been given to Rights Commissioners
not just under the 2003 Regulations but under other employment
legislation. IBEC’s view is that if legislation is invoked then problems
should be dealt with systematically in terms of what the legislation
provides, and claims established by reference to the legislation. The
181

Although even here, the general lack of reporting of Circuit Court decisions at present
is also felt to be problematic, making it difficult to find out what has happened in an
individual case unless one has contact with one of the parties.
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approach of rights commissioners by contrast is felt to be primarily an
industrial relations problem-fixing approach rather than a more
appropriate legal one which would be primarily concerned with the
accurate determination of entitlements under the Regulations.
Furthermore, there is felt to be a lack of consistency as between the
approaches of different Rights Commissioners. Ideally, IBEC would feel
that rights-based issues should be taken out of the hands of Rights
Commissioners entirely and dealt with by the EAT, with interest-based
issues dealt with by the Labour Court.

F. THE USE OF
IMPLEMENTATION
IRELAND.

A
OF

FORM OF SOCIAL DIALOGUE IN THE
EMPLOYMENT-RELATED DIRECTIVES IN

In the context of a paper discussing the use of the social dialogue in the
social policy field, it is of interest to note that a domestic process of social
dialogue has existed for some years in Ireland, and that, at least in the
context of the implementation of the Acquired Rights Directive, this
process has been intimately linked with the transposition of social policy
directives. Thus it is of interest to note that it was in Sustaining Progress,
the national social partnership agreement negotiated and entered into in
2003 between the government, and the social partners and covering the
years 2003-2005,182 that the Government committed itself to transposing
the mandatory provisions of Directive 2001/23/EC by means of
Regulations, by March 2003. In a further extension of the dialogue
process, the Government explicitly undertook to consult the social partners
on those provisions of the consolidated Directive which member states
had an option either to implement or not (e.g. the pension interests of
transferred employees) and undertook that it would then consider what
required to be implemented by way of primary legislation.183 According to
182

Sustaining Progress - Social Partnership Agreement 2003-2005 (2003, Government
Publications Office, Dublin)
183

Sustaining Progress - Social Partnership Agreement 2003-2005 (2003, Government
Publications Office, Dublin), paragraph 10.8, p. 79. It is understood that according to
legal advice provided by the Attorney General (based, it may be surmised, on the rulings
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Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment interviewees, it is in
any case standard practice under national social partnership agreements,
that the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU), the Irish Business and
Employers Confederation (IBEC) and any government department which
might have an interest 184 are consulted in relation to proposals, a process
which is seen as carrying with it the advantage of avoiding political
difficulties in the Oireachtas.
As regards the form of the consultation process in relation to employment
legislation such as the 2003 Regulations, the first point which can be made
is that the length of time given to it will vary according to the context or
difficulties involved. There were meetings in the Department of
Enterprise, Trade and Employment with IBEC and ICTU prior to the
adoption of the 2003 Regulations. An IBEC interviewee noted that IBEC
makes both written and oral submissions and of lobbying the Department
of Enterprise, Trade and Employment in relation to important new
legislation. As regards ICTU, draft regulations were sent for comment and
ICTU were given a number of weeks to send their comments in, having
shown it to its constituent members. Comments were duly sent to the
Department. Individual trade unions were not consulted by the
government, which channels its consultations via ICTU, but ICTU
consulted them before sending in its own views.
According to information provided by the Department of Enterprise, Trade
and Employment, subsequent consultations have been engaged in
regarding the provisions of the Directive which it is optional for each
member state to implement, although it would seem that this particular
process—undertaken in fulfillment of the Government’s explicit
undertaking in the Sustaining Progress agreement to consult the social

of the Supreme Court in Meagher v Minister for Agriculture and Food and others [1994]
I.R. 329 and Maher, Brett and Ryan v. Minister for Agriculture [2001] ILRM 481) the
optional provisions of the Directive must be implemented by primary legislation by virtue
of the requirements of Article 15.2.1° of the Irish Constitution.
184

Thus the Department of Social and Family Affairs and the Department of Finance
were consulted in relation to the 2003 Regulations before they were adopted.
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partners regarding the optional provisions of the Directive 185 —was of a
fairly rudimentary nature. At the end of 2003, letters were sent by the
Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment to ICTU and IBEC who
replied to these, although, according to Department of Enterprise, Trade
and Employment interviewees, there were optional provisions of the
Directive in respect of which no comments were received by the
Department.186 It would appear that no ongoing consultations concerning
the Regulations have been engaged with either IBEC or ICTU apart from
this.187
The results of this ‘social dialogue’ approach to implementation seem
somewhat mixed. On the one hand, implementation of the Directive has
been politically uncontroversial and has taken place in a context of
consensus, and some of the credit for this must be attributed to the social
dialogue processes which have led to its implementation, both in the the
national social partnership agreement and subsequently . On the other
hand, the fact that the Department appears to require consensus before it
will propose or adopt implementing legislation may be seen as an
Achilles’ heel to the process. Hence, for example, the government’s
approach of transposing by primary legislation only such optional
provisions of the Directive as can be agreed upon as desirable by the
social partners has given an effective veto to the IBEC, the national
employers’ organisation over the implementation of all optional provisions
of the Directive, with no incentive to negotiate. The result is that to date,
185

Sustaining Progress - Social Partnership Agreement 2003-2005 (2003, Government
Publications Office, Dublin), paragraph 10.8, p. 79.
186

Among the issues which the social partners did comment upon were the issues of
pensions, and the option under Article 3(1) of the Directive of providing for joint and
several liability on the part of transferor and transferee, as well as the option under
Article 3(2) of the Directive of compelling the transferor to notify the transferee of the
rights and obligations to be transferred.
187

ICTU organised a seminar for its own members on the Regulations on 27 May 2003 at
the Gresham Hotel Dublin when the Regulations were published at which academic
speakers and a speaker from the Department spoke. This allowed what was felt by the
Department to be a useful exchange of views between the Department and ICTU.
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only one of the several such optional provisions has been implemented.188
Similarly, although explicit reference was made to the topic of pension
interests of transferred employees in the Government’s undertaking in the
Sustaining Progress agreement to consult the social partners on the
optional provisions of the 2001 Directive,189 the ICTU’s expressions to the
Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment of its deep
dissatisfaction with the present legal position regarding pension rights in
transfer situations have had little effect up to the time of writing.190

188

In accordance with Article 3(2) of the 2001 Directive, s. 21_ of the Employees
(Provision of Information and Consultation) Act, 2006, now imposes on the transferor of
an obligation to notify the transferee of all rights and obligations which will be
transferred to the transferee, so far as those rights and obligations are or ought to have
been known to the transferor at the time of transfer. In contrast, no reliance has been put
on the options provided e.g., by Article 4(1) of the Directive, Article 3(1), Article 3(4)(a),
Article 5(1) and (3) or Article 7(5).
189

Sustaining Progress -Social Partnership Agreement 2003-2005, op. cit., n. 186,
paragraph 10.8, p. 79.
190

On the other hand, it must be acknowledged there is a broader debate on pensions
going on in Ireland at the moment, including over the issue of whether pension provision
should be made compulsory and there seems to be a reluctance on the part of the
Department to deal with the legal position on pensions in the particular context of transfer
situations before the pensions issue generally is addressed, or to go further than is
envisaged in the 2005 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on Improving the Portability of Supplementary Pension Rights. (COM(2005)
507 final, Brussels, 20.10.2005). Fears were also expressed that compelling transferees to
assume responsibility for (expensive) defined benefit pension schemes and for possibly
insolvent pension schemes would be likely to deter transfers altogether, and in this way
work against the ultimate interests of employees in preserving their employment with the
undertaking being transferred.

